International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses developments in the Middle East, Balkans and around the world. Anant Mishra, visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales, and Dr. Christian Kaunert, Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, prepared comprehensive analysis entitled “Operation True Promise 2: Has Tehran altered its national security strategy?” in which the authors examine the security strategy of Iran after first attacks against Israel.
On October 1, the world witnessed Iran launching its second direct attack against Israel, roughly after six months. Code-naming the attack as Operation True Promise 2, the assault was Tehran’s retaliation to the Israeli assassination of critical politico-military leadership of the Axis’ of Resistance and its senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders. The code name echoed its first-ever direct attack on Israel, Operation True Promise, reflecting Tehran’s intent to consolidate, perhaps strengthen its position in (what appears to be) the long-drawn conflict, which elevated from intelligence-driven assassinations to tactical confrontation. Demonstrating its tactical capability and operational capacity, the authors argue that this retaliation was to send a message to Israel to perhaps re-evaluate any future aggression directed against Iran. That said, it remains uncertain whether Tehran’s latest retaliation achieved some goals (if any).
However, Tehran’s latest escalatory retaliation point towards significant alterations in its national security strategy. As Israeli incursions into Lebanese territory appear more than probable, Tehran has fewer tactical options, giving it no choice but to elevate its status as a nuclear state, raising the threshold of a possible regional war with the intent to deter Israeli military might.
For decades, Tehran’s retaliation against Israel was based on two critical tactical options:
A former IRGC commander, in an interview with the authors, defined those mentioned above as key pillars of Tehran’s Forward Defence Doctrine, which sought to consolidate and expand Tehran’s power in the Middle East and deter (any and all) adversaries across its border. What was once considered to be the tip of Iran’s national security strategy, the forward defence appears to experience tremendous pressure due to the attrition war between Israeli Defence Forces and its Axis’ with limited to no success post-April, making no impact on Israel’s tactical posture or its strategic foresight.
Instead, Tehran’s April retaliation resulted in an Israeli Air Force strike on an Iranian consulate annexe building (which also hosted the Iranian ambassador's residence) inside the Iranian embassy complex in Damascus. With the intent to target Israel directly, Tehran’s April 1 strike against Israel was fuelled to put an end to any future Israeli assassinations, perhaps drawing a line, and put an end to any politico-military casualties inside Iran or anywhere in the Middle East.
That said, Tehran’s retaliatory strike on April 1 further strengthened Israeli resolve. Following Tehran’s strike on Israel, the Israeli Air Force carried out an airstrike in the southern suburbs of Beirut, killing senior Hezbollah commander and Lebanese national Fouad Shukr. This was followed by the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, just hours after the inauguration of President Masoud Pezeshkian, in the outskirts of Tehran, a tactical blunder considered by many Iranians, even terming the assassination as ‘crossing a line’. These attacks were conducted in retaliation to Hezbollah’s rocket strike in a Druze village on 27 July, which claimed the lives of over 12 children, among others.
In the following week, Iranian political leaders and Hamas/Hezbollah commanders alike vowed for vengeance. However, both Hamas and Tehran (among other proxy groups) refrained from conducting attacks inside Israel, perhaps supporting the then ceasefire engagement over Gaza. By demonstrating tactical restrain, the authors argue, Tehran achieved what it could not through tactical action: putting a halt to Israeli offensives against its Axis/, albeit temporarily. That said, Hezbollah fighters appeared restless and sought vengeance against the killing of its commander, Fouad Shukr, which could have potentially deviated the proxy group from Tehran’s direction of ‘exercising tactical restrain’, conducting over 300 rocket strikes inside Israel. This brought Hezbollah into the crosshairs of Israel.
Not learning any lessons from Israel’s escalation, Israeli resolve to decapitate the heads of Hezbollah received no mention in the strategic/military cordons of Tehran. On 27 September, an Israeli airstrike killed Hassan Nasrallah, the then secretary-general of Hezbollah, crippling the most crucial element connecting Tehran with its proxy group while seriously compromising its operational capacity by killing its deputy commander of operations, Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan. The death of Nasrallah may have been felt across the Middle East, but the killing of Brig General Nilforoushan was felt inside the military corridors of Tehran. The attack not only proved Israeli tactical resolve against Hezbollah but also exposed Tehran’s inability to defend (more like protect) its proxies’ leadership from Israeli strikes.
What emanated from the aftermath of Hassan Nasrallah was purely rhetoric. Tehran echoed its resolve to deter any threats against Israel, even re-affirming its commitment to the people of Gaza while calling the larger Muslim world to unite against Israel. On September 30, the Iranian Foreign Ministry released a statement declaring its intention not to deploy military forces to Lebanon or Gaza. The Ayatollah, too, advocated using its Axis’ to deter Israel on the battlefields. This is a moment Tehran could have found itself in a dilemma. Launching a conventional military operation against Israel would undoubtedly elevate the stakes to a regional war, drawing in the technologically superior and tactically capable United States.
A tactical restraint could potentially tarnish Tehran’s reputation among its Axis’, causing chaos within its carefully crafted and strategically built proxy groups, one that is central to its Middle East policy and potential survival. Tehran’s decision to refrain from engaging with proxy groups outside Hamas/Hezbollah—such as the network of militia formed by Shia fighters in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq—and conduct tactical retaliation against Israel, to this day, remains a mystery even among former politico-military leadership within Tehran. The authors then conducted a series of interviews with former politico-military leaders to understand Tehran’s perception of the loss of Hezbollah/Hamas leadership, which collectively pointed towards Tehran’s reluctance to accept its significantly weakened position or influence in the region.
The sheer sentiment of losing prestige as a regional power player was echoed even within Iranian military leadership. On one account, a former IRGC commander opined of senior military leadership echoing Syria and Iraq to be next after Lebanon, post-which a combined US-Israel invasion of Iran itself. On further enquiring about the sentiment, one former IRGC commander stated it to be isolated but echoed the sentiment to have been unanimously discussed and argued within the military hierarchy, even probing for a pre-emptive military response and counter Israeli offensives pro-actively, rather than demonstrating its image as vulnerabile and hopeless.
The statement mentioned above was echoed even by the local Iranians who acutely criticised the reformist president over his intent to re-establish diplomatic engagement with the West (many considered him appeasing the West in times of war), prioritising a possible nuclear deal and ignoring their responsibility towards regional partners. Many argued that a stern response from Tehran after Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination could have saved Hassan Nasrallah, pointing towards a possible decision-making paralysis within Iran’s top politico-military hierarchy. Iran’s continued rhetoric against Israel, even after holding an arsenal of extensive missiles and UAVs reinforced with the capability of its vast Axis’, appeared substantially weak. It will not be incorrect to state that Tehran’s rocket attack of April proved counterproductive as it not only escalated Israeli attacks against its proxies but created disarray within its ranks, potentially limiting its valued proxy Hezbollah from creating effective counter manoeuvres to deter an Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
Then came Iran’s retaliation on 1 October—a completely different response, one that varied significantly from the April attack.
During the April attack, Tehran’s arsenal was diverse. It had included a mix of ballistic missiles with the capability of reaching targets in minutes, reinforced by UAVs and cruise missiles, both of which took hours to reach their destination. When compared with the October attack, Tehran’s response was limited to the use of ballistic missiles, with the intent to shorten time perhaps and overwhelm Israeli air defences. It also used fewer ballistic missiles than the attack in April but introduced one of the most advanced weaponry in its arsenal, the Fattah-1. The authors, on comparing Iran’s April and October attacks, conclude the latter to have been focused on targeting critical Israeli military infrastructure. Even though the damages reflected were minimal, it appeared Israeli military assets were deliberately chosen to minimise the loss of human lives.
That said, Tehran’s attack in October was not carried in diplomatic warnings—at least the frequency did not match the ones in April. However, some indications were sent to Washington by Tehran, according to one State Department official. But, it was nowhere near the dedicated warning Tehran gave regional allies, asking them to vacate all US bases from their territories. However, Tehran pointed both the attacks as retaliatory towards Israeli aggression, but the latest attack reflected its intention not to further the escalation, perhaps reflecting its intent to ‘manage’ if not control the current situation.
Tehran’s tactical approach to possibly deter Israel (in Lebanon or its continued attacks against Tier-1/2 leadership of its Axis’) or perhaps force Israel to re-calibrate its tactical manoeuvres (or even alter its more extensive strategic play) remains unimpactful. Instead, the authors opine that Tehran appeared to have launched missiles and assumed it to automatically symbolise as a deterrent, hypothesising its effectiveness at least on paper. That said, Israel is expected to retaliate more severely/aggressively than it did post-April. Even today, experts in Jerusalem opine of a strong attack being planned by Israeli leadership against Iran.
Taking the statement mentioned above into account, Israel will not hesitate to target Iranian nuclear sites, particularly Iran’s primary enrichment facility at Natanz (which houses the commercial Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)) with two above ground buildings used for gas centrifuge assemblies. It may also target its key oil refineries in Isfahan and Abadan, offshore gas facilities in the Persian Gulf, or cripple its supply chain by decimating Bandar Abbas to the ground. Any one of the attacks mentioned above has the potency to cripple Iran’s economic and operational capability potentially. In addition to this, one Tehran-based scholar argues, Israel may target Iranian military sites such as the assembly lines and production facilities of the Iranian missile system. Such an attack could cripple Tehran much more quickly (somewhat temporarily) without attracting much hue and cry from international communities and regional allies on the impacts of potential nuclear fallout.
Even if assuming Tel Aviv does carry an attack on Iranian soil, Tehran’s retaliation against Israel will arrive if not weeks, but months later (as witnessed from April and October) without much effect, strengthening the argument of its inability to protect the prestige of ‘once feared’ Hezbollah, which could further weaken Tehran’s position in the region while raising suspicion on the effectiveness of its current strategy, even by members of its Axis’. Tactically, the authors argue, Operation True Promise 2 can be considered as more advanced than the one in April, but yet again demonstrated Tehran’s reliance on long-range ICBMs—even if it is equipped with sophisticated technology—which may not be enough to counter Israeli tactical manoeuvres in the longer run or strategically counter the Israeli military might in a full-scale war.
Taking the perspective of Iran becoming a nuclear state, it possesses all the necessary elements required to build a nuclear weapon. It has:
All it needs now is the ‘right motivation’ to assemble one. Although Tehran strongly opines on its nuclear program to be strictly for peaceful means, its ability to use the weapon against Israel must have crossed the minds of political leadership in Tehran.
This would mean the politico-military leadership in Tehran wouldn’t be blind enough not to realise the potency of an Israeli attack on its nuclear sites.
This means a nuclear-capable Tehran would strengthen its borders more effectively when it integrates its nuclear policy with its national security strategy. Since the use of missiles and proxy elements will remain effective at a particular point against tech-savvy, tactically superior Israeli Defence Forces, any push from Jerusalem could potentially force Iranian political leadership to openly advocate for achieving a nuclear weapon. This could perhaps put a rush order on Tehran’s nuclear weaponisation program, with the intent to instil fear within regional adversaries, in particular Israel & the US. This would mean the October 1 attack relayed a message of caution to Israel by demonstrating Fattah-1 as one of many delivery mechanisms it has in its arsenal with the capability to carry a nuclear payload, creating strategic balance.
Considering the nuclear rhetoric emanating from Iranian political space and the saga of ineffective and delayed retaliation reflecting its strategic quagmire among regional allies and the Axis’, the atomic option appears to be its last resort. As political hardliners begin to question the effectiveness of forward defence, Tehran seems to be exploring all avenues in its quest to deter Israeli tactical manoeuvres credibly.
About the authors:
Anant Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales.
Dr. Christian Kaunert is Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, Ireland. He is also Professor of Policing and Security, as well as Director of the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales. In addition, he is Jean Monnet Chair, Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence and Director of the Jean Monnet Network on EU Counter-Terrorism (www.eucter.net).
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.
Ljubljana/Cardiff/Dublin 16 October 2024
[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has Special Consultative status at ECOSOC/UN, New York, since 2018 and it is publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives”.
