The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly conducts analyses of events spanning the Middle East, the Balkans, and global affairs. IFIMES analyses the current situation in Syria following the fall of Bashar Al-Assad's regime. From the analysis titled "Syria 2025: The historical Syrian project: From revolution to a modern inclusive civil state," we present the most important and interesting excerpts.
In just ten days, on 8 December 2024, a surprise military offensive by the armed factions of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Ahmed Al-Sharaa, brought a swift and unexpected end to the bloody chapter of the Syrian civil war, which had raged from 2011 to 2024. This marked the conclusion of the Al-Assad family's dictatorship in Syria, which had lasted for more than half a century. Bashar Al-Assad, who had ruled since 2000 after inheriting power from his father Hafez, fled the capital and sought exile in Moscow. The brutal conflict began during the "Arab Spring,"[2] a wave of uprisings that toppled regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. The Syrian civil war left a devastating toll: over 300,000 people were killed, five million were forced to flee the country (1.3 million to the EU and four million to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq), and nearly seven million were internally displaced. The Syrian conflict was defined by harrowing episodes that became part of the history of human tragedies, such as Assad's deployment of chemical weapons against civilians, claiming the lives of tens of thousands.
This dramatic turn of events represents a decisive moment in Syria's history, while simultaneously presenting considerable challenges that will test the liberators' ability to secure a peaceful transfer of power. The opposition now faces the formidable task of uniting disparate armed factions to forge a cohesive vision for the next phase of building a state inclusive of all its citizens. Equally critical is the need to establish effective governance over newly liberated territories during this transitional period. The way the opposition addresses these challenges will shape Syria’s future in the years to come.
While the coalition led by HTS spearheaded the offensive that ultimately toppled Assad, other armed factions also played a significant role in the regime's collapse. Major groups, such as the Syrian National Army (SNA), concentrated their operations on northern regions and around Aleppo, while local fighters engaged in areas like Daraa—the birthplace of the 2011 uprising against Assad—Suwayda, home to Druze communities, and even the outskirts of Damascus. Motivated by the swift defeats of the regime elsewhere, these groups took up arms to liberate their territories. This broad participation hastened the regime's collapse but also created fragmented spheres of influence under the control of various armed factions across Syria. Today, one of the most pressing challenges is accommodating the diverse interests of these groups and fostering cooperation and harmony among them. However, this will be no easy feat. Sustaining an alliance among such diverse factions—each with distinct priorities, leadership styles, and the ambitions of external sponsors—is a monumental undertaking. While their shared goal of toppling Assad secured unified support, the current landscape is marked by foreign influences and the ambitions of regional actors, which have already emerged as potential sources of discord, division, and confrontation. Left unresolved, these divisions could halt progress and threaten the fragile stability of the state.
To analyse the future policies of Syria’s interim administration, one must first examine the personality of its leader, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, or Abu Mohamed Al-Golani, as he was known during his time as the leader of the Al-Nusra terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaeda. He is a pragmatic figure whose journey commands both respect and controversy. In a defining historical moment, he chose to lead the victorious march on Damascus. As the dream of a new Syria began to rise from the ashes of civil war, he led a battle heralded as the dawn of a new chapter in the nation’s history.
Ahmed Hussein Al-Sharaa was born in 1982 in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, into a middle-class family with liberal views and roots in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. He pursued medical studies for two years. Al-Golani arrived in Iraq at the onset of the US invasion in 2003, joining the ranks of Al-Qaeda under the command of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, where he steadily rose through the organisation's hierarchy.
He was arrested by American forces and detained in Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad. From there, he was transferred between several US-operated facilities, including Camp Bucca and Cropper at Baghdad airport, before being handed over to the Iraqi government. The Iraqi authorities detained him in Taji prison until his release in 2008. Upon regaining his freedom, he resumed his military activities, working alongside Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, who was then the leader of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Mosul, Iraq.
After the outbreak of the Syrian revolution against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad, he returned to Syria to establish a branch of Al-Qaeda there. In 2012, he founded the Al-Nusra Front. Shortly thereafter, he came into conflict with the Islamic State (ISIS), which at the time controlled one-third of Iraq and a quarter of Syria. He remained loyal to Al-Qaeda, led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri.
Al-Nusra achieved significant victories against ISIS and the Syrian Army, becoming one of Syria’s most powerful armed factions. It distinguished itself through effective operations against regime forces and pro-Iranian militias, while also engaging in influence battles with other armed groups.
In July 2016, Al-Golani announced his organisation's split from Al-Qaeda. The following year, he founded the Syrian Islamic organisation Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), with a primary focus on combating Al-Qaeda and ISIS, in an effort to improve his position and image among Western countries.
HTS succeeded in defeating ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and most opposition forces within its territory, imposing its control over much of Idlib province, designated as a de-escalation zone in 2017[3]. It then assumed administrative control of the province and founded the Syrian Salvation Government. Idlib became the first territory liberated from Assad's forces and a refuge for displaced civilians from other parts of Syria.
The Syrian Salvation Government effectively managed the region's civil and military structures, introducing a functional taxation-based financial model. They also attracted some investors who provided employment for the local workforce. The standard of living for the region's three million residents, including displaced people from other parts of Syria, was significantly higher than that of citizens under the control of the Syrian regime in Damascus. In 2021, the government established a military academy modeled on British military schools and tactics and worked on developing weaponry such as the "Shaheen" drones. It also pursued various development projects, including e-governance, which enabled electronic operations for both the government and the population.
On 27 November 2024, opposition factions led by HTS launched the battle "Deterrence of Aggression," reaching Damascus in 13 days. Al-Golani declared himself the chief commander of the military operation and began using his real name, Ahmed Al-Sharaa.
As he advanced on Damascus, Al-Golani continued to reassure the Syrian people and its religious, national, and ethnic communities that the freedom of ethnic and religious groups would be safeguarded. In his first message before entering Damascus, he addressed HTS fighters, stating: "Enter Damascus humbly and preserve the state institutions that belong to the great Syrian people, so that together we may complete the victory of the greatest revolution in modern Syria. Uphold the morality of victors, adhere to the true teachings of the Islamic faith, and respect human values."
It is undeniable that HTS fighters conducted themselves as a disciplined, well-trained military force with a clear chain of command, rather than as unruly hordes or bands. They were very careful to prevent civilian casualties, collective or individual reprisals, or displacements during the liberation process. Observers noted no significant incidents or acts of revenge during the transition of power, unlike in Iraq, Libya, or Egypt.
The media appearances of Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the leader of the new Syrian administration, showcase a carefully orchestrated public relations campaign launched a while ago. In every interview, he appears in civilian clothing, delivering clear answers and preemptively addressing journalists’ questions. He seeks to reassure the global community and the West of his commitment to protecting religious and national minorities while extending a message of peace to neighbouring nations, particularly Israel.
His well-prepared answers to every controversial question suggest that he is backed by a robust advisory and media team and is fully aware of all the questions he is likely to face. His delivery creates the impression that he is reading from a carefully written script prepared by an American public relations firm. He has completely changed his rhetoric, presenting himself as a pragmatic politician and statesman rather than the leader of an armed group. In all his media interviews, Al-Sharaa seems at ease, refrains from interrupting his interlocutors, and handles difficult questions without appearing flustered.
Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the leader of the transitional administration in Syria, has adopted a rational and balanced political discourse, prompting Western observers to regard him as a modern politician and a representative of a new generation of promising leaders in the Arab world. Nonetheless, assessing or judging him solely on his political rhetoric would be premature until more tangible results are achieved.
The transitional administration has begun shaping the characteristics of the future political process. Recent statements from the administration indicate that elections may not take place before 2028, as significant preparations are needed, including drafting a new constitution and meeting the prerequisites for legitimate elections. This process runs parallel to the restructuring of political life, starting with the dissolution of military groups and their integration into a newly formed regular Syrian army under the Ministry of Defence, as well as the transformation of some military groups into political entities to help create the political future of the new Syria.
Establishing the foundation for a successful political process in Syria seems difficult to achieve within this timeframe unless sufficient political will is shown by other key actors. These include the pro-American Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which control nearly a quarter of the country, along with its most vital oil, gas, and agricultural resources, and the pro-Turkish Syrian National Coalition (SNC), headquartered in Istanbul. Turkey controls 8,835 km², or 5% of northern Syria, designated as a "security zone." Meanwhile, Israel has expanded its occupation of the Golan Heights and now controls approximately 1,100 km² of Syrian territory.
The new Syrian administration’s vision for the future political process demonstrates a commitment to avoiding a repeat of Iraq’s reconstruction experience following the US invasion in 2003. It seeks to prevent the mistakes made during that time, particularly the exclusion of Arab Sunnis from the political process, which sparked a civil war and ultimately led to the rise of ISIS between 2014 and 2017.
In drafting a new constitution, the administration seeks to avoid the pitfalls experienced during the creation of Iraq's 2005 constitution. That document introduced two political principles for the first time: "quotas" and "federalism." Moreover, since the American invasion, Iraq’s political system has been largely dominated by political parties with their own paramilitary militias, resulting in stronger loyalty to militias than to the state. It is evident that the political discourse of the new administration firmly rejects both principles: quotas and federalism. Similarly, the shortcomings of the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) in Bosnia and Herzegovina must not be repeated in Syria, as they risk creating a dysfunctional state. The establishment of entities within Syria and the adoption of a quota-based system would be disastrous for the country, echoing the negative experiences of Bosnia and Herzegovina that must be avoided.
A population census is a crucial prerequisite, as electoral rolls cannot be prepared without it. Under the current circumstances, organising elections is unfeasible with nearly half of the population still in exile or internally displaced (approximately 13 million people, according to UN estimates). Facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons requires the development of essential infrastructure—housing, healthcare, and education—to restore normal life and ensure the political process has both legitimacy and credibility.
Assuming that the national dialogue begins in March 2025, the first priority for its success is addressing the human, social, and economic needs of the population. This requires advancing the national dialogue along two parallel tracks: political and developmental. The political track involves the constitution, legislative institutions, elections, and standards for regulating the political participation of individuals and groups. The developmental track focuses on the reintegration of displaced persons, the restoration and construction of essential infrastructure, and, equally important, the integration of members of the former regime's administration, military, and police into the new political system.
While moderate and rational, this political discourse does not guarantee its implementation on the ground. It is based on the rejection of ethnic and religious quotas, regarded as harmful to the state and disruptive to institutional operations. Additionally, the new leadership opposes federalism, favoured by Alawites and Druze, as well as decentralisation, preferred by Kurds and Christians. The administration envisions a civic state, one that enjoys internal harmony, fosters peaceful relations with its neighbours and the international community and poses no threat to other nations (Israel, Turkey, Jordan). However, this vision fails to address how the state would respond to external threats. It also remains incomplete when it comes to the state’s reaction to internal resistance during the disarmament or dissolution of armed groups. Any such resistance risks plunging the country into another civil war. Moreover, many regional actors have their own reasons for wanting to see Syria destabilised.
Transitional justice[4] is undoubtedly the most suitable approach to addressing the aftermath of internal wars, particularly where serious crimes have been committed. Securing civil peace and fostering internal reconciliation requires rectifying injustices, providing compensation to victims, uncovering the fate of the missing, ensuring individual accountability, and rejecting the collective blame of any ethnic or religious group for such crimes. Perpetrators must be held accountable through judicial institutions. Acts of vengeance and retaliation can only be prevented if victims are assured that their rights will be upheld and that those responsible will not escape justice.
Transitional justice is distinct from traditional justice in its goals, rules, standards, bodies, and mechanisms, and it must never devolve into injustice. Transitional justice extends beyond prosecuting perpetrators and enforcing laws, placing a stronger emphasis on restoring civil peace, fostering national reconciliation, and remedying the consequences of violent conflict. If the repercussions of such conflict remain unaddressed, they risk reigniting violence and chaos. A defining feature of the principles and standards of transitional justice is their foundation in international laws and regulations, as many crimes committed during civil wars may not be adequately defined in local legislation due to their exceptional nature, making international references to similar contexts and events necessary.
The most significant hardship endured by Syrians during more than five decades of Assad's regime has been the absence of justice. Through Article 117 of the Syrian Constitution, the President granted himself absolute constitutional immunity from prosecution and punishment. Additionally, legal immunity was extended to members of the security services, military, and police, except with explicit approval from the Minister of Defence or the Director of State Security. This framework empowered these individuals to perpetrate war crimes and crimes against humanity in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising.
Under Assad's rule, the President exercised control over the judiciary in his capacity as head of the Supreme Judicial Council, turning the judiciary into a tool for suppressing and dismantling the rights of Syrians.
Foreign relations are a fundamental component of building a modern state, essential for establishing a peaceful and stable life within its geographical borders.
Regarding foreign relations, Al-Sharaa stated that Syria has strategic interests with Russia. He emphasized that he does not want Russia to exit in a manner unbefitting its relationship with Syria, noting that "Russia is the second most powerful country in the world and holds immense significance." Moscow operates two military bases in Syria, it acted as a key ally to Assad during the protracted civil war, and provided him asylum following his removal from power.
In terms of the transitional administration’s relations with the United States, Al-Sharaa expressed hope that the incoming U.S. administration, under newly elected President Donald Trump, would chart a different course from the outgoing administration of Joseph Biden. He also expressed optimism that Trump’s administration would lift the sanctions imposed on the country.
Senior American diplomats who visited Damascus were impressed by their talks with Al-Sharaa. They described him as a pragmatic politician, leading Washington to revoke the $10 million reward previously offered for information leading to his arrest as the leader of the terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Al-Sharaa assured the Americans of his commitment to stabilising the country’s political and economic situation.
He reiterated to the diplomats that he should not be seen as a future dictator: "I do not consider myself the liberator of Syria. The country was liberated by all those who sacrificed themselves," he said, emphasising that HTS made significant efforts to prevent civilian casualties or displacement during the liberation process. "We worked hard to ensure a smooth transfer of power," Al-Sharaa added.
Observers assess that Trump’s stance on the new Syrian administration remains open to all possibilities, especially considering the new administration’s relationship with the U.S. allies in the SDF and the presence of approximately 2,000 American troops in the region.
The collapse of the Syrian regime has been both inevitable and imperative since the onset of the popular uprising in the spring of 2011. Over 13 years of clinging to power at any cost, the Syrian regime deployed all its deadly weaponry to suppress peaceful demonstrations, including chemical weapons. It opened the country’s borders to sectarian and terrorist organisations such as Hezbollah and other Shia militias from Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, it sought assistance from foreign powers like Russia and Iran, resulting in Syria being occupied by Iran, Russia, the United States, and Turkey, while also enduring the ongoing Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights since 1967.
While Syrians look forward to a transparent and equitable framework for the country’s future political system, they remain hopeful that future Syria will embrace its diversity without discrimination and will not differentiate between citizens based on ethnicity, race, religion, or sect. They hope this transformation will pave the way for a civic state and an inclusive society grounded in justice and equality, fostering peaceful coexistence among all segments of Syrian society. Having endured immense suffering, including loss of life, oppression, and displacement during the civil war from 2011 to 2024, Syrians now aspire to a brighter tomorrow and seek to restore their homeland to the state it was before Al-Assad and his family seized power.
Syria must preserve its sovereignty and dignity, guaranteeing inclusion for all its citizens without exception. The fall of this oppressive regime offers a genuine opportunity to build a new, unified homeland that reflects Syria’s rich history and its cultural and civilizational diversity, moving beyond tyranny and sectarian divisions.
The world failed to support the Syrian people when they were oppressed by the former regime, and now they need the backing of the UN and other international institutions. Throughout the civil war, the global community let the Syrians down, but a historic opportunity has now emerged to rectify these grave mistakes and champion their aspirations for a brighter future. The time has come for the world to stand firmly with the Syrian people.
Ljubljana/Washington/Bruxelles/Damask, 16 January 2025
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives”, link: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] The Arab Spring refers to the mass protests that swept across the Arab world between 2010 and 2014. This unprecedented movement began in Tunisia on 18 December 2010, eventually extending to North Africa and the Middle East. Available at:The Arab Spring refers to the mass protests that swept across the Arab world between 2010 and 2014. This unprecedented movement began in Tunisia on 18 December 2010, eventually extending to North Africa and the Middle East. Available at: www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring
[3] The Astana Agreement, signed on 4 May 2017, between the Russian Federation, Iran, and Turkey as guarantor states, aimed to monitor the ceasefire regime in Syria and establish de-escalation zones in accordance with the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015). Available at: https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Astana_Agreement_Guarantees_May_2017.pdf
[4] Transitional justice is a branch of law that studies methods for addressing past human rights violations in transitional societies. It is one of the most important instruments of democratization processes led by international organizations, as it can serve as an effective catalyst for post-conflict reconciliation and stabilization. Available at: www.mreza-mira.net/wp-content/uploads/Sta-je-tranziciona-pravda.pdf
