The International Institute for Middle Eastern and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], headquartered in Ljubljana, Slovenia, conducts regular analyses of developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, and globally. Ahead of the regular parliamentary elections in Kosovo, set for 9 February 2025, IFIMES has prepared an analysis of the current political situation. From the extensive analysis titled "Parliamentary elections in Kosovo 2025: A new approach needed for Kosovo," we highlight the most important and interesting excerpts.
Kosovo is set to hold its parliamentary elections on 9 February 2025, the ninth since the declaration of independence on 17 February 2008. These will be the first regular elections since 2010, as political instability led to several early elections in recent years.
A total of 28 political entities, comprising 1,280 candidates, are participating in the elections, including six representing the Serbian community. The total number of registered voters is 2,075,868. Of this number, 1,970,944 voters reside in Kosovo, while 104,924 are registered abroad. According to the population census conducted in April and May 2024, Kosovo's population stands at 1,586,659. This disparity becomes even more pronounced when considering that the total number of registered citizens includes young people who are not yet eligible to vote. The Central Election Commission (CEC) has designated 941 polling stations across 38 municipalities, with one station per municipality reserved for conditional voting. Among the 28 political entities, 19 are political parties, five are coalitions, two are citizens’ initiatives, and one is an independent candidate.
The Kosovo Assembly consists of 120 members, with 20 seats reserved for representatives of minority communities. The Serbian community holds 10 mandates, the Bosniak community three, the Turkish community two, the Roma (RAE communities) four, and the Gorani community one seat. The electoral threshold for securing entry into the Kosovo Assembly is set at 5%.
The three main political contenders are: the Self-Determination Movement (Vetëvendosje-VV) led by Albin Kurti, in alliance with the parties Alternativa and Guxo; the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) under Lumir Abdixhiku; and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) led by Memli Krasniqi. The leading opposition parties have not registered a joint pre-election coalition with the Central Election Commission, indicating the state of their mutual relations. The political entity that wins the most votes will have the opportunity to form the government.
The outcomes of the elections—both the parliamentary elections and the local ones scheduled for autumn 2025—will dictate the dynamics of potential political and security developments. Relations between Serbian and Albanian political parties are expected to take shape during the parliamentary election campaign. An aggressive campaign could further exacerbate the already strained relations between them. The election campaign started prematurely, and Kosovo remains entangled in the complexities of geopolitics.
Kosovo has once again caught the attention of the international community, as both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been identified as security hotspots in the Western Balkans. On the matter of Kosovo, two conflicting constitutional perspectives exist: one asserts that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia, while the other, under Kosovo’s constitution, recognises Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state. How can relations be normalised through the ongoing dialogue on normalisation while reconciling these two diametrically opposed constitutional positions?
In recent years, Kosovo has become a platform for the fabrication of various political scandals designed to create internal instability. This trend has become particularly pronounced with the rise of Albin Kurti (VV) as the head of Kosovo’s government. Certain Kosovo opposition parties, in collaboration with segments of foreign actors and a rogue faction within the judiciary and prosecutorial apparatus, are making every effort to overthrow Prime Minister Kurti.
Analysts believe that Albin Kurti has succeeded in dismantling a significant portion of the political-criminal structures in Kosovo. The strength of these structures is evident in their persistent attempts to remove the current Prime Minister Kurti from office.
It is no secret that some opposition parties in Kosovo have established ties with Belgrade. It is widely acknowledged that the former President of Serbia, Boris Tadić, the leader of the Democratic Party (DS), cultivated close relations with Kosovo’s Prime Minister, and later President, Hashim Thaçi (PDK). Tadić went so far as to state that, with his support, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) would secure full membership in the Socialist International (SI).
Analysts suggest that a rogue faction within the judiciary, particularly within the prosecutorial system, is preparing to orchestrate a fabricated scandal targeting Prime Minister Kurti and some of his closest allies during the final stage of the election campaign. Preparations have been completed and are being meticulously coordinated in collaboration with certain foreign actors, with the scandal expected to be unveiled at the height of the campaign.
The upcoming parliamentary elections will serve as a test for Serbian political entities to solidify their leadership within Kosovo’s Serbian community.
Six Serbian political entities will participate in the elections: Srpska lista (Serbian List), Srpska demokratija (Serbian Democracy), Srpski narodni pokret (Serbian People’s Movement), Za slobodu, pravdu i opstanak (For Freedom, Justice and Survival), Partija kosovskih Srba (Party of Kosovo Serbs), and Građanska inicijativa narodna pravda (Civic Initiative People's Justice).
The Serbian List, the largest political party representing Kosovo Serbs, has the backing of official Belgrade. Since its formation in 2013, it has won every election it contested and, since November 2022, has largely boycotted the government of Prime Minister Albin Kurti. The extent to which Serbian parties will cooperate with Kosovo’s future government will depend on who wins its leadership. Following the parliamentary elections, local elections will take place, marking a critical juncture for the Serbs and northern Kosovo, potentially allowing the Serbs to return to local government institutions and laying the groundwork for the establishment of the Association of Serbian Municipalities (ASM).
Even before the election campaign began, parts of the Serbian opposition and Albanian political parties initiated a confrontation with the Serbian List (SL), which enjoys the unconditional support of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić (SNS). By targeting the Serbian List, the election favourite within the Kosovo Serbian community, they aim to challenge President Aleksandar Vučić and leverage their personal ties with individuals in Belgrade involved in protests seeking to unseat him. Fears about the establishment of the Association of Serbian Municipalities (ASM) persist but are often exaggerated, as its structure remains undefined. The ASM remains a sensitive issue for both sides, with each holding maximalist expectations regarding its implementation. Its formation is contingent upon the holding of local elections in northern Kosovo.
Kosovo’s recent population census played a vital role in collecting reliable data to inform and shape the country’s overall societal development. However, the census was boycotted by the Serbian community, especially in the four northern municipalities with a Serbian majority (Mitrovica, Zvečan, Leposavić, and Zubin Potok). While the UN’s methodology does not mandate the inclusion of ethnic or religious affiliation in census data, these declarations have taken on critical importance in the context of Kosovo.
Bulgaria is exploiting tensions between Serbs and Albanians by "identifying" an inflated number of Bulgarians in Kosovo and granting them Bulgarian citizenship, thereby effectively providing EU citizenship. Serbs, Bosniaks, and Gorani have been particularly targeted, with their populations significantly diminished due to Bulgaria’s aggressive efforts to reclassify them as "Bulgarians" through the issuance of citizenship and Bulgarian documentation. The process of Bulgarisation in Kosovo has accelerated, with Bulgaria seeking to constitutionally legitimise the presence of Bulgarians within Kosovo’s demographic framework. The next step involves amending Kosovo’s constitution to officially recognise a Bulgarian community, following similar demands already made of the Republic of North Macedonia. In Albania, Bulgarians appeared for the first time in the recent population census. According to the 2023 census, 2,281 individuals identified as Macedonians, while 7,957 were listed as Bulgarians, despite this being the first census to officially include the Bulgarian minority community in Albania. In all 11 previous censuses, not a single resident of Albania identified as Bulgarian, highlighting the impact of an intensified Bulgarisation process. Bulgaria’s ultimate goal is for Bulgarians to gain official recognition as a minority community in Kosovo and, eventually, to surpass the Serbian community in numbers.
Alongside "Bulgarisation," Kosovo is experiencing a growing trend of "Catholicisation," despite Catholics making up only 1.75% of the population. This trend is being driven by organised efforts, supported by certain international actors, to increase the number of Catholics. The initiative promotes the narrative that Albanians must return to their supposed religious roots—Catholicism—under the premise that this would bring them closer to Europe and establish Catholicism as central to their identity. Historically, Albanians have been associated with multiple religious denominations, and religion has not played a defining role in shaping their national identity. Nonetheless, some opposition leaders in Kosovo have secretly converted to Catholicism to curry favour with specific foreign circles, while, a few years ago, Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama (PS) publicly embraced Catholicism. This is far from a benign project and has the potential to disrupt the traditional religious harmony among Albanians. The seriousness of this project is underscored by data from Albania’s recent population census, which reveals that, for the first time, Muslims are no longer the majority religious group. Projections indicate that by 2050, Catholics could comprise over 20% of Kosovo’s population, while Albania is expected to become a country with the largest Catholic community in the region.
Analysts believe that Albin Kurti has the potential and political strength to preserve intra-Albanian unity and prevent a religious divide among Albanians, which could have lasting and far-reaching consequences. Albanians must return to adhering to Albanian customary law (the Canon of Gjergj Kastrioti Skënderbeu and the Canon of Lekë Dukagjini), which has historically ensured religious harmony and addressed matters of religious affiliation among Albanians.
For the EU, redefining its approach to Kosovo is more critical than simply appointing a special envoy for the region. The international community as a whole must embrace a fresh strategy for Kosovo. A proliferation of agreements between official Belgrade and Pristina has resulted in a cycle where each new agreement effectively masks the shortcomings of its predecessor.
The EU-mediated dialogue on normalising relations has faltered due to the EU's lack of a coherent policy and vision for "conflict and crisis management." A security crisis is likely to persist into 2025, highlighting the urgency of reaching a security package agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. If both Kosovo and Serbia aim to achieve normalised relations and European integration, they must align under a unified European security framework.
The appointment of a new EU Special Envoy for dialogue is important, as Miroslav Lajčak effectively ceded control of the process to other actors, failing to establish clear principles for the negotiations or the implementation of the Brussels Agreement. While governments in Pristina have changed, Serbia’s chief negotiator has consistently been President Aleksandar Vučić. However, Lajčak is not solely responsible for the collapse of the dialogue on normalisation. Several EU member states have pursued parallel connections and bilateral relations with both Serbia and Kosovo, undermining the EU’s mediation efforts. The role of the United States, particularly under the new administration led by Donald Trump, is crucial for normalising relations between Serbia and Kosovo. Speculation that Danish diplomat Peter Sørensen will be appointed as the new EU Special Envoy for dialogue is likely to heighten corruption risks.
Kosovo’s current presidency of CEFTA marks an important opportunity. During this period, Kosovo must exhibit a constructive approach to regional cooperation and focus on eliminating barriers among CEFTA members to enhance economic ties and strengthen other forms of collaboration in the region.
The forthcoming parliamentary elections in Kosovo will serve as a plebiscite on whether the Self-Determination Movement (VV) can secure more than 50% of the vote. The public opinion agency Valicon[2] conducted a survey in Kosovo from 10 to 15 January 2025 using the CATSI method, polling a sample of 776 respondents aged 18 and above. The confidence interval at 50% is ±3% with a 95% confidence level. Valicon publishes its pre-election studies publicly and fully funds its research, ensuring the results are independent and transparent.
Of the 27 political parties and one independent candidate participating in the elections, four political entities are projected to secure more than 90% of the total votes. These elections are a referendum on whether VV can achieve a majority, as they are teetering on the edge of surpassing the 50% threshold. Twenty per cent of voters remain undecided, presenting a significant opportunity to gain support during the campaign. With nearly three weeks to go until the elections, VV is the clear frontrunner. Currently, PDK holds the second position, though LDK appears to have greater potential to overtake it.
If the elections were held today, the results would be as follows. The projection is calculated solely among decided likely voters (confidence interval: ±3.5%):
● VV 52%
● PDK 19%
● LDK 15%
● AAK-NISMA 8%
● PAI 1%
● NDS 1%
● PBKDSH 1%
● Others 3%
The results among the general population reflect current political preferences. However, the significant proportion of undecided voters, standing at 20%, remains a critical factor. Their decisions will be pivotal in determining whether the Self-Determination Movement (VV) achieves a majority exceeding 50%.
The potential for tactical voting is not evenly distributed. The chart below illustrates the range between the estimated share of guaranteed support ("assured") and the estimate of the party's ultimate reach ("reach"). The blue field represents highly likely voters, while the green field reflects the possible effect of tactical voting in favour of a given party. The intervals are quite wide and vary considerably from party to party, indicating that the potential for tactical voting is not evenly distributed among all parties. Additionally, these ranges are much wider than the statistical confidence interval.
With nearly three weeks remaining until the elections, VV is the clear frontrunner and cannot be surpassed by LDK or PDK. VV’s projected share of the vote ranges from 40% to 59%, depending on the final phase of the campaign. PDK currently holds second place, but LDK, with its stronger potential, could still overtake it and claim the second position in terms of vote share. Meanwhile, AAK-NISMA remains theoretically in contention for third place.
Ljubljana/Washington/Bruxelles/Priština, 24 January 2025
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives”, link: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] Source Valicon. Available at: https://www.valicon.net/
