The International Institute for Middle Eastern and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], headquartered in Ljubljana, Slovenia, conducts regular analyses of developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, and globally. With Kosovo's parliamentary election campaign entering its final stage before the 9 February 2025 vote, IFIMES has analysed the current political situation. From the extensive study “Parliamentary elections in Kosovo 2025: Is there a renewed push for the partition of Kosovo?”, we highlight the most important and interesting sections.
As Kosovo prepares for its ninth parliamentary elections since independence, the campaign is heading toward its culmination.
The International Institute IFIMES has previously published a pre-election analysis titled “Parliamentary elections in Kosovo 2025: A new approach needed for Kosovo”, available at: https://www.ifimes.org/en/researches/parliamentary-elections-in-kosovo-2025-a-new-approach-needed-for-kosovo/5443? (24 January 2025).
A total of 28 political entities are participating in the parliamentary elections, including 19 political parties, five coalitions, two citizens' initiatives, and one independent candidate. Among them, six represent the Serbian community.
The Kosovo Assembly has 120 parliamentary seats, with 20 reserved for minority communities. Of these, 10 are allocated to the Serbian community, three to the Bosniak community, two to the Turkish community, four to the Roma (RAE communities), and one to the Gorani community. The electoral threshold is set at 5%.
Three main political actors have emerged as the front-runners: Albin Kurti’s Movement for Self-Determination (Vetëvendosje – LVV), backed by the Alternative and Guxo parties; the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Lumir Abdixhiku; and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) under Memli Krasniqi. A fourth contender, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), is attempting to secure a place in the Kosovo Assembly under the leadership of the controversial Ramush Haradinaj, who has been linked to both Serbian and Albanian organised crime, with connections extending to Russian criminal networks.
Analysts argue that it comes as no surprise that political-criminal and mafia structures have poured vast amounts of money and resources into toppling Albin Kurti and the Movement for Self-Determination, even hiring foreign mercenaries to discredit him and orchestrate his media assassination. This makes the upcoming parliamentary elections a last chance for Kosovo to confront its “war criminals” and “peace criminals” — those who have captured the country, plundered it, and reduced it to the brink of becoming the poorest nation in Europe. Kurti has halted Kosovo’s decline, is steering the country out of the grip of organised crime, and leads the only government that has not bowed to external influences. The return of political-criminal and mafia structures to power would set Kosovo back to square one, creating new uncertainty for citizens in an already turbulent period and environment, with the added threat to its very existence. “War criminals” and “peace criminals” must not and cannot decide Kosovo’s future. Foreign politicians and operatives backed by political-criminal and mafia networks hold little sway or legitimacy in Kosovo, as they are neither accepted nor recognised by the people, who do not identify with them. Their influence is being artificially imposed through funding from dubious and criminal sources. Kosovo’s voters must independently decide on their support for Kurti and their future, free from any pressure.
It is well known that former Kosovo President Hashim Thaçi (PDK) was a strong advocate of Kosovo’s partition, and at the time, the only political force to oppose his plan was the Movement for Self-Determination. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) tacitly supported the partition, having been in crisis for years and having lost its identity and credibility following the death of Ibrahim Rugova. LDK’s decline culminated when Avdullah Hoti (LDK) became Kosovo’s interim prime minister.
The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) has never renounced Hashim Thaçi’s political legacy or his role in the partition of Kosovo. To this day, the party remains under the influence of political-criminal structures that pull the strings from behind the scenes. PDK has never truly evolved into a genuine political party in the full sense of the word. The plan to partition Kosovo is directly linked to Bosnia and Herzegovina, raising further alarm in that country.
The LDK has failed to reform or adapt to changing circumstances, having long been accustomed to operating in secrecy rather than engaging publicly and transparently. Since Rugova’s death, it has struggled to elect the right leader.
Analysts describe certain opposition leaders as figures whose identity is shaped more by power and wealth than by political programmes or a vision for a better Kosovo. Kurti’s agenda of social justice and equality directly challenges these structures, with his reformist stance placing him in an increasingly precarious position. Adding to this is a rogue faction within the judiciary, working in coordination with foreign actors to systematically craft and spread fabricated scandals and allegations against Kurti and his closest allies. This explains the highly charged nature of the election campaign. What is unfolding is not a routine political confrontation but a carefully orchestrated campaign, devised within centres of criminal and judicial power, aimed at eroding public trust and weakening both Kurti and the Movement for Self-Determination. This is why it is crucial to continue dismantling Kosovo’s entrenched political-criminal structures, which remain a formidable force, as evidenced by their persistent efforts to unseat Prime Minister Kurti.
Former Kosovo Prime Minister and President Hashim Thaçi (PDK) maintained close ties with Belgrade, which have remained unbroken to this day. Later, Ramush Haradinaj expanded and reinforced these connections through his own channels.
Minority communities must be represented by their legitimate, self-elected representatives. Particular attention is being given to the elections within the Serbian community, which holds 10 seats in parliament.
The Serbian List, the largest party representing Kosovo Serbs, is expected to secure all ten seats in the Kosovo Assembly with the backing of official Belgrade. Following the parliamentary elections, local elections will take place—an especially significant event for Serbs, particularly in northern Kosovo, as it could enable their return to local self-government institutions, where they hold a dominant majority.
Pristina remains wary of the formation of the Association of Serbian Municipalities (ASM). However, strong international pressure is expected to drive its implementation forward. The exact structure of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities remains unclear. The ASM has become a highly sensitive issue for both Serbian and Albanian political actors. Without local elections in northern Kosovo, its establishment cannot move forward.
Kosovo represents a unique phenomenon when it comes to the return of young, educated individuals from the diaspora. This is a crucial factor in Kosovo’s economic and overall social development. While mass emigration remains a dominant trend across the Western Balkans, the unexpected visa liberalisation for Kosovo has halted the outflow of people. This is driven not only by government policies but also by the increasingly difficult economic situation in Western European countries, particularly Austria and Germany.
Given the deep-rooted presence of political-criminal and mafia structures in Kosovo, a comprehensive post-election effort will be necessary to investigate their connections to certain media outlets, particularly their sources of funding. The inquiry should also extend to foreign officials who operate in service of these structures, scrutinising both the origins and channels of their financial support.
Interestingly, the PDK is seeking to expand Russian influence in Kosovo as a form of retaliation against the United States for Hashim Thaçi’s trial before the Specialist Chambers (KSC-SPO) in The Hague, for which they blame the US. Moreover, some opposition leaders in Kosovo have long maintained strong ties with Moscow.
Kosovo’s so-called "independent" media are far from embodying professionalism or high journalistic standards; instead, they function as mere outposts of political-criminal structures, eroding their own credibility in the process. There must be constructive criticism, offering viable alternative solutions, whereas the opposition and its compliant media behave in a way that devalues their standing. Rather than elevating public discourse, their reliance on sensationalism, factual distortions, and unprofessional reporting has blurred the focus on the government’s legitimate shortcomings. Such behaviour has directly affected the public’s ability to take their criticism and objections seriously, effectively shielding the government from accountability. By muddying the waters of public discourse, these actors have, paradoxically, provided Kurti’s government an unintended reprieve from meaningful scrutiny.
The opposition must confront its own historical burden and past mistakes. To move forward, it must break away from its criminal past, sever all ties with organised crime and corruption, and fully commit to Kosovo’s political, ethical, and social renewal. This is not just a matter of perception—it is a prerequisite for restoring credibility. The opposition must demonstrate that it has a clear programme, a strong vision, integrity, and the capability to present a viable alternative to Kosovo’s current administration.
Kosovo’s opposition has become its own worst enemy. Trust is built through a clear vision for the future, reforms, and the implementation of bold ideas, alongside a genuine fight against crime and corruption—not through backroom dealings with discredited journalists and a legacy of criminal entanglements.
Kosovo cannot afford stagnation or a regressive and rigid political environment. A credible opposition is essential to any thriving democracy, ensuring that the government is challenged, held accountable, and truly serves the people of Kosovo. The opposition’s failure to meet these challenges is not only a disservice to its own political prospects but also to the citizens of Kosovo, who deserve far higher standards of governance and public discourse.
If the Kosovo opposition hopes to remain a key political force in the future, it must permanently abandon its entrenched methods, break ties with discredited media figures, and shift its focus to meaningful reforms. Only in this way can it restore public trust and raise the quality of policies and political culture in Kosovo. Any other course of action will only perpetuate the current cycle of dysfunction, leaving the country deprived of the strong democratic standards and practices it so desperately needs.
Accountability cannot exist when the opposition’s main instruments are lies, scandals, and manufactured controversies, while Kosovo’s future hinges on integrity and a steadfast commitment to reforms.
However, the sheer volume of disinformation and the widespread decline in media quality in Kosovo have, at times, left even seasoned observers unsure of what is true. This cacophony of misinformation and low journalistic standards is not just a concern for the media community—it reflects a broader democratic deficiency in society. A well-functioning democracy depends on access to information, civic dialogue, and a responsible, credible opposition that holds the government accountable. When both the opposition and the media fail in their societal roles, the entire political system and society as a whole suffer the consequences. Kosovo’s democracy needs a new political culture.
When the media and the opposition obfuscate the truth, they inadvertently shield those in power, further corroding Kosovo’s democracy. Genuine renewal requires an unavoidable break from a corrupt past.
A plot to assassinate Albin Kurti was uncovered in 2021 after he refused to play by the old rules in Kosovo which were set by the political-criminal and mafia elite backed by a tycoon oligarchy that holds the country in its clutches.
The provocation and attack on Kurti in Drenica/Drenas during the election campaign in late January 2025 have reignited concerns over the security of Kosovo’s Prime Minister. The harsh and dirty rhetoric, the convergence of criminal elements with political and media operatives—none of this is coincidental. Together, they are creating an atmosphere for Kurti’s elimination. The stakes are no longer just about his political survival but about whether he will survive at all.
If his adversaries and the enemies of Kosovo succeed, it will not be just one man who falls—it will be the future of a country that dared to break free from its past and the grip of the mafia. Kosovo would not only lose its prime minister; it would lose the very future he fought for.
The upcoming parliamentary elections mark the final desperate push of political-mafia structures and the tycoon oligarchy in their attempt to remove Kurti and reclaim power.
If history teaches us anything, it is that a political leader who disrupts and threatens the interests of oligarchs, criminals, political mafias, and foreign powers is never simply voted out—he puts himself in danger and becomes their target. Those who strive to secure a future for their nation must face the harsh reality that they themselves may be eliminated. Such is the fate of Albin Kurti.
Ljubljana/Washington/Bruxelles/Priština, 6 February 2025
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives”, link: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
