International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses developments in the Middle East, Balkans and around the world. Martin Kreutner is spiritus rector and Dean Emeritus of the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA) as well as former Executive Secretary of its Assembly of Parties and Member of IFIMES Advisory Board. His comprehensive analysis entitled “Yalta 2.0 is crushing Helsinki – Multilateralism upside down”[2] is a cursive, historical categorization and critique from theory and reality.
The concept of geopolitics has three dimensions: geography, politics, and time(s). These three elements have significantly shaped the (division and subsequent order of today’s) world particularly through the Yalta Conference, the 80th anniversary of which was commemorated a few weeks back. A second major process culminated 50 years ago in the Helsinki Final Act (and the Helsinki mechanism). For some time now, the world has once again been undergoing a complex metamorphosis, a “Zeitenwende” as it is commonly referred to.
It is still on everyone's lips and is often quoted - this Zeitenwende (a turning point in history) that the (outgoing) German Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed in the Deutsche Bundestag on 27 February 2022 following the Russian Federation's illegal attack on Ukraine. Neither then nor now has this Zeitenwende seemingly been fully understood in its inherent complexity, its multidimensionality, and the range of its consequences. As a kind of teaser for the following observations, it is worth recalling that on 01 March 2025, Elon Musk, one of US President Donald Trump's closest allies and advisors, once again announced that the USA should withdraw from the UN and NATO, respectively.
This turning point - contrary to some Eurocentric perspectives - did not have its exclusive historical origin on 24 February 2022, nor was it unforeseeable, monocausal, or - if it were intended - unavoidable in the first place. Rather, it was the culmination of a long, global process of emancipation and alienation away from the mechanisms and realities of a de facto unipolar world post 1989/1991 - a process of emancipation and alienation that has spanned at least the last one and a half, if not three decades.
For the European-Western world, the historical milestones in the formation of the existing international order, beginning in the modern era, were foremost the Peace of Westphalia with its resulting principles - (1) state sovereignty, (2) legal/sovereign equality, (3) peaceful coexistence (non-intervention), (4) maintenance of (formalized) inter-state relations (inter-state diplomacy) -, the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15, the 14 points of US President Woodrow Wilson of 1918, the peace treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain-en-Laye, resp., in 1919 at the end of the First World War (WWI), and in particular the year 1945 with the end of the Second World War (WWII) and resulting in the current international order plus its current "International System". The years 1989-1991 with the collapse and dismembratio of the former Soviet Union and her military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, are of similar (regional/global) significance. In 1945, the Yalta Conference (04 to 11 February) should be highlighted in particular; a conference where the "Big Three" of the (then upcoming) war winners (USSR, USA, UK) trilaterally decided on the future world order.
In many cases, the perception and historical assessment by those countries that are now known as "The Global South" is significantly different. However, the perspective of these countries is central to understanding the current Zeitenwende. The geographical North-South positioning plays less of a role in the categorization of the Global South than the socio-economic and socio-historical classification and (self-)perception of the respective states over (at least) the last century. Formally simplified, the term “Global South” could be understood today as the UN Group of states of the "G77 plus China", whereby from a realpolitik perspective - even if only for reasons of asserting interests - the Russian Federation (RF) more often than not geostrategically aligns herself with this group. To illustrate the scale and significance of this grouping, it should be recalled that this refers to 134 States plus China and the Russian Federation - out of 193 fully recognized States worldwide.
In post-colonial political science and literature, as well as in a separate critical school of thought on international law known as the Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL) - and increasingly not only there - the Global South is more and more referred to as "all countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America [...] that do not see themselves as part of the West and share historical experiences of marginalization by the West" (Johannes PLAGEMANN/Henrik MAIHACK). From the perspective of this supposed "rest of the world", the following dates and events are particularly significant and must not be underrated.
In August 1791, a slave revolt broke out in the French Caribbean colony of Saint-Domingue, followed by a revolution. As one of the consequences, Haiti was created in 1804, the first and only state in world history to be founded by former slaves.
In 1823, a good 200 years ago, the then US President James Monroe unilaterally proclaimed the "Monroe Doctrine" of the same name, unilaterally declaring the US’ right to zones of influence in the Americas (and later beyond), which - in an expanded or modified practice - still forms an underlying, ultimately unilateral-imperial pillar of US foreign policy and explanation for (often military) interventions in the 20th century (and beyond).
In the mid-19th century, the Chinese Empire was choked by the colonial and imperialist "Opium Wars" (1839-1842 and 1856-1860), as a result of which it had to place the territory of Hong Kong under comprehensive British control, open treaty harbours (e.g., Shanghai) to trade with foreigners, and grant special rights to foreigners working in those harbours. The Opium Wars, to be followed by subsequent interventions by (other) European states, the Sino-Russian war(s), and the later (partial) Japanese occupation (with the most gruesome massacre in the then capital Nanking in 1937/38) led to a lasting trauma for the formerly proud, 5000-year-old Chinese nation. This overall period of time thus became a building bloc and essential point of reference and identification for Modern China from 1949 onwards, also known as the "century of humiliation".
The 13th Amendment to the US constitution, which was passed by the US Congress on 31 January 1865 and ratified on 06 December 1865, finally abolished slavery in the United States. The long legitimized and cultivated institution of dehumanization and depersonalization through the de facto transformation from `subject´ to a realizable `object´ of (mainly African) human beings - in short: slavery - represents a central point of reference in the disposition of the Global South vis-à-vis the Western world up until today. For the sake of fairness, while not in an apologetic sense, it should be mentioned that slavery did not only exist on the American (and European) continent at the time, but also in the Middle East, in wider Asia, and in Africa herself.
In order to control and manage the rapidly increasing colonialism of European States on the African continent from the middle of the 19th century in a `multilateral’ (selective) way, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1884/85 invited representatives from 14 countries to agree on rules and arrangements for the further occupation of Africa and to define their respective ownership claims on that continent - an event that became known as the "Berlin Congo Conference". Not a single representative from Africa herself was present. The consequences of that exogenously imposed allocation of borders, peoples, and property at this conference continue to this day.
A similar division, this time bilateral and based on any spoils of war from the perceived fall of the Ottoman Empire in the context of the First World War, is represented by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which was concluded in secret negotiations between the British Empire and France. It has had a decisive impact on the borders and future spheres of influence of the Middle East to this day and is also one of the reasons for the armed conflicts in this region of the world since then. Uprisings and independence aspirations of the local populations were willingly accepted or deliberately instrumentalized, as the British head of delegation, Mark Sykes, openly devised in a memorandum, "It was clear [...] that an Arab rising was sooner or later to take place, and that the French and ourselves ought to be on better terms if the rising was not to be a curse instead of a blessing".
India, now the world's largest democracy and fifth largest economic power, only gained her independence from the United Kingdom in 1947 (at the same time as the new state of Pakistan). As a British colony at the end of the Second World War in 1945, India therefore had no chance of joining the 51 founding members of the United Nations, the latter of which was formally founded on 24 October 1945. Against the same backdrop, India was by no way eligible for being considered for (permanent) membership of the UN Security Council despite its already exceptionally large population at the time. Now a Member State of the UN, there are many loud voices these days in favour of the latter - keyword Security Council reform.
WWII shook the colonial system globally, the more so as the two remaining superpowers, the Soviet Union in particular, but also the United States, clearly opposed that oppressive system. As a reference, the right to self-determination and the principle of equal rights for all peoples are enshrined as apodictic maxims in Article 1 (and 2) of the United Nations Charter. What is more, the UN has been committed to this goal from day one.
A comprehensive decolonization process thus took place over the next 50 years, and in 1960 alone, the "Year of Africa", 17 sub-Saharan States became independent and thus the number of independent UN Member States (UNMS) from Africa, at 37, exceeded those of any other continent. Nevertheless, to this day - keyword Security Council reform - there is still no African State (not even the African Union as a regional organization) among the UN Security Council's “Permanent Five” (P5), i.e., those with veto power. Also in 1960, the UN General Assembly eventually adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
To bring an end to French colonial power and occupation, for the Asian region, the Battle of Diên Biên Phú in 1954 and the subsequent independence of the former Indochina, and for the African continent, the Algerian War and the resulting independence of Algeria by the Évian Agreement of 1962 are worth recalling. Finally, in April 1994, the first general and free elections were held in South Africa, marking the end of a decades-long struggle against the white apartheid regime, with Nobel Peace Prize winner Nelson Mandela becoming the country's first black president.
Almost unknown in the West, but all the more significant in the collective memory of the Global South was the first Asia-Africa Conference in the Indonesian city of Bandung in April 1955. Delegates from 29 African and Asian States met to express their desire for independence and non-alignment, to demand the fundamental rights of the colonized peoples, and to express their opposition to European domination.
Six years later, the majority of these States found themselves together with others when the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was founded in Belgrade (of the former Yugoslavia) on 01 September 1961 as a platform for those countries that did not want to join any of the blocs of the Cold War. Even today, the NAM has 120 Member States, representing around 4.8 billion people, or almost 60% of the world's population, although today it plays only a rather modest role in everyday international affairs.
The Helsinki process, a series of events that followed the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1972, which was initiated by Soviet leaders in the era of détente, culminated in the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. Seeking to reduce tension between the Soviet Union and Western bloc(s), the Helsinki process promoted discussions on, inter alia, human rights and fundamental freedoms. It was also called to enhance economic, scientific, and humanitarian cooperation between East and West and was later by the Charter of Paris 1990 and the Budapest Summit of 1994 "upgraded" into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Today, the Helsinki Process stands - albeit somewhat idealized – synonymously, and geographically beyond the "Helsinki states", for a consultative, deliberative, and cross-bloc mechanism for reconciliation of interests and problem resolution on equal footing within the framework of true multilateralism.
The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the resulting dismenbratio/dissolution of the former Soviet Union in December 1991 not only made possible the grosso modo above-mentioned enhancement of regional (CSCE/OSCE) cooperation and ended the global Cold War - at least for the following around 20 years - but also the transformation of international relations towards a de facto unipolar world - an order that would last for about three decades and a system that, by its driving forces, very readily and exclusively described itself as the guardian and custodian of the international rule(s)-based order.
This self-attribution and ultimately also proactive, de facto assumption of roles was hardly perceived positively only - especially in regions and states of the "non-Western" sphere. Rather, it was increasingly seen from those angles as less than legitimate paternalism, as triumphalism in action, as a delegitimized and (too) often double-standard global de facto hegemony of the West over the rest of the world. Terms of self-description or postulates of self-perception used to this day by the West, such as cultural (et al.) supremacy, national exceptionalism, moral (et al.) primacy, full spectrum superiority/dominance, natural hegemony were/are not only hardly helpful in this context, but also difficult to reconcile with the spirit and ratio legis of the UN Charter.
If the argument is raised here - partly justified - that Europe is by no means to be equated with the USA, nor is the West a monolith, it must be countered that in the international arena and from the perspective of other regions, these subtleties in distinction seem increasingly blurred. From the assessment of the Global South, the last significant expression of Europe's geostrategic independence was France’s and Germany's refusal to join the US in the 2003 Iraq war under George W. Bush; and future, lasting developments in that relationship after the confrontational first weeks under the Trump-II administration are still unclear.
This image, this de facto hegemonic order, was challenged early on and increasingly showed first cracks. The internationally renowned political scientist Ivan Krastev places the beginning of Russia's alienation from the West at the start of NATO's illegal bombing of Serbia in spring 1999 ("Operation Allied Force"), which lasted almost four months. States Krastev, "The NATO bombing of the remnants of Yugoslavia without a corresponding UN mandate was, however, without doubt the moment when Russia began to break with the West in a fatal way." Two paragraphs further on, he continues, "The deeper meaning of these events from the Kremlin's perspective provides an explanation for why Putin keeps talking about Kosovo. It also explains why his public explanation of the 'special military operation' in Ukraine [of 2022 sequ.] echoes word for word NATO's justification for the bombing of Yugoslavia 25 years earlier" (Ivan Krastev in Der russische Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine im Spiegel Jugoslawiens).
Another decisive turning point was Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference on 10 February 2007. At this event, he accused the West of an "almost uncontained hyper use of force - military force - in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts", denouncing Western talk of freedom and democracy as a hypocritical front for power politics. Furthermore, Putin once again drew "red lines" regarding a further eastward expansion of NATO towards the borders of the Russian Federation, with a special focus on Ukraine. In this context, he was also referring to and instrumentalizing the term "indivisibility of security", first mentioned in the preamble to the Helsinki Accords of 1975.
The principle of the "indivisibility of security" is repeatedly translated into the dictum, "An increase in the security of one must not come at the expense of the security of another." The Paris Charter for a New Europe, which was adopted at a major Summit on the future of European relations, held in Paris from 19-21 November 1990 as part of the (then) Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), includes a commitment to "strive for a new quality in our security relations while respecting each other's freedom of choice", adding "security is indivisible" and "the security of every participating State [would be] inseparably linked to that of all other States.”
Nevertheless, this term has also been instrumentalized as a supposed justification for unfriendly to openly aggressive interventions latest since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, but also for, e.g., the war in Afghanistan (2001-2021), the Iraq War by the US in 2003, the annexation of Crimea by the RF in 2014, and the start of the “special military operation”, i.e. invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022.
On a similar note, the scope of meaning and application of the term "(national) security" also appears to be expanding in an increasingly inflationary manner towards the "securitization of everything” (Daniel W. Drezner in Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 2024) – and, as a consequence, so do inflationary justifications for all kinds of interventions, unilateral coercive measures, and acts of aggression in the global power play.
In the author's opinion, the decisive turning point in relations between the powers on the geopolitical chessboard came in 2011. Not only did 2011 mark the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring movement, the start of the Syrian civil war with significant military interventions and territorial occupations by Turkey and other powers in (mainly northern and north-eastern) Syria (that continue to this day), as well as the beginning brutal instrumentalization of the Kurds in the fight against extremist groups, but it also stands in particular for the military intervention by external forces in Gaddafi's Libya.
On the evening of 17 March 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 (2011) with ten votes in favour and five abstentions. Among other things, it provided for the establishment and monitoring of a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace and the enforcement of an arms embargo. Among the "Permanent Five” (P5) of the Security Council, there had been - prior to the adoption of the Resolution - an intense debate on the scope of the mandate of Resolution. In this context, China and the Russian Federation in particular made it clear that they would only refrain from using their veto if it was to be unequivocally established, by means of a restrictive interpretation of the resolution, that the monitoring of the no-fly zone and the arms embargo by international military forces would not be misused for – from their perspective - still another exogenous regime change. Among other things, the resolution explicitly stated, "excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory" and the primacy of the UN Security Council over further measures for and the decisions over political conditions in Libya.
A "coalition of the willing", consisting in particular of the USA, France, and the UK, then ultimately carried out by military means nevertheless precisely this conditionally excluded regime change - in their own national interest. For many countries of the Global South this constituted - in addition to the obvious violation of international law - a significant and final breach of trust and confidence in (the self-declared guardians of) the existing international order - the already germinating global crisis of multilateralism was hence even more cemented.
(In addition to Germany, also) Brazil, Russia, India, and China abstained from voting on the aforementioned Libya Resolution in the UN Security Council – the latter countries have become known as “BRIC” states in a different format. Even if there was no obvious causal nexus to the voting behaviour on the Resolution, a few weeks later, on 13 April 2011, South Africa also joined the BRIC format as the fifth State (on the occasion of the third BRIC summit in the Chinese city of Sanya). This completed the now familiar abbreviation “BRICS”, and the format became increasingly important.
In 2006, the four States began regular informal diplomatic coordination with annual meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the margins of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). This interaction led to the decision to continue the dialogue at the level of Heads of State and Government in annual Summits. Since 2009, the depth and scope of the dialogue between the members of the BRIC(S) countries has been further expanded. In their self-perception and description, BRICS has since become more than just an acronym used to describe emerging markets in the international economic order. "BRICS has become a new and promising political and diplomatic entity that goes far beyond the original concept tailored to the financial markets.”
With the accession of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on 01 January 2024, and the accession of Indonesia as recently as 06 January 2025; plus Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan announced as `partner countries´ as of 01 January 2025; the BRICS countries (BRICS+) now account for around 46% of global GDP and 55% of the world's population. More than 40 other countries - including NATO-country Turkey - have signaled their interest in joining the format as well.
It has been repeatedly argued for years that the political interests and socio-economic realities of the BRICS+ members are too divergent to allow for international gravitas for the format. In this context, reference is made to, inter alia, the border disputes between China and India; India's strong non-alignment history and present, the latter evidenced, inter alia, by her Minister of Foreign affairs' strong statement, "Our overall posture does radiate the message that India will no longer be a punching ball in the politics of others" (Subrahmanyam JAISHANKAR, Why Bharat Matters), China's alleged hegemonic aspirations in Asia; disputes between the Russian Federation and China over new sea routes (e.g., "Northeast Passage"), and many more. However, the key telolateral purpose, the ratio fundationis, of the format is thereby overlooked: overcoming and creating an alternative to the de facto unipolar hegemony of the West and, where attainable, its systems.
Against that backdrop, countries in the Global South also "want to escape the hegemony of the dollar when they see Western countries, for instance, freezing Russian central bank reserves in 2022 as a response to the invasion of Ukraine but receiving no punishment for similarly unlawful military interventions in the Middle East and Africa." (Alexander GABUV & Oliver STUENKEL in Foreign Affairs, Sept. 2024). China's President Xi Jinping put it somewhat more diplomatically, but with the apparently same intention, at the 2022 BRICS summit in Beijing, "Politicizing, instrumentalizing, and weaponizing the world economy using a dominant position in the global financial system to wantonly impose sanctions would only hurt others as well as hurting oneself, leaving people around the world suffering. Those who obsess with a position of strength, expand their military alliances, and seek their own security at the expense of others will only fall into a security conundrum."
In all these endeavours, the BRICS+ countries are apparently not calling for the overthrow of the rule-based order per se or the replacement of the UN with their own format. Rather, they consistently refer to the UN Charter and call on all parties to adhere to the existing rules within the current rule(s)-based order, however, without applying double standards. In conclusion, a future multipolar world order is not seen as a threat by the BRICS+ countries (and many others beyond), as it arguably is the case in the West, but rather as a “promising emancipatory prospect” (Johannes PLAGEMANN/Henrik MAIHACK) for themselves in the geopolitical arena.
Another region of the world seems to have been less successful in the last two decades. Having been honoured with the Nobel Peace Prize as an institution in 2012, the European Union and Europe in toto seem to be stumbling increasingly disoriented through the Zeitenwende(n). The postulate of a common economic area from Lisbon to Vladivostok, which the penultimate German Government ("Merkel IV") had still enshrined in its coalition agreement as late as 2018, has obviously been shelved by all sides; French President Charles de Gaulle had already spoken out in favour of such an alliance from the Atlantic to the Urals, which "will decide the fate of the world", in a famous speech in 1959 - even then as a hidden and critical questioning of the transatlantic alliance structures and the leading role of the USA expressed therein.
The latter is a development that appears to be repeating itself in an explosive sequence and manner after the first weeks of the Trump-II administration and, in particular, the reactions to the coram publico confrontational meeting between Presidents Trump (USA) and Zelensky (UKR) (and US Vice-President J.D. Vance) in the Oval Office on 28 February 2025. To summarize, and without prejudicing the conclusions outlined at the end, one could say that Europe would have the opportunity (and actually need) to position herself as her own geopolitical centre and with her own school of thought alongside the gradual change in perspective and trajectory (arg. multipolarity) demanded by the BRICS+, on the one hand, and the highly disruptive, often erratic approach of the Trump-II administration (arg. interest-driven "deals"), on the other.
In general, Europe seems further away than ever from “always be[ing] a global player”, which the then EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker postulated, inter alia, at his State of the Union Address on 12 September 2018. He called on all Member States that, “It is time Europe took its destiny into its own hands. It is time Europe developed what I coined `Weltpolitikfähigkeit' – the capacity to play our role in shaping global affairs. Europe has to become a more sovereign actor in international relations”. The statement seems almost unworldly compared to today's realities, even if underlying circumstances and developments were not God-given, but seem to include a good deal of sleepwalking and complacency, “strategic naivety and geopolitical incompetence” (©Kishore Mahbubani, senior Singapore diplomat and former UNSC President) by European decision makers despite numerous warnings.
Realities are: Europe is far away from any negotiating tables in any of the major geopolitical conflicts, even if the latter take place at her borders or on her own geographical doorstep; the economy has been stagnating for years or even in its third year of recession; a creeping and alarming deindustrialization is putting essential core industries under essential pressure since years; in matters of strategic energy supply and security policy, European politics is oscillating between different external dependencies and for instance seems to have lost interest also in investigating, shedding a light on, and prosecuting those who sabotaged one of the most important strategic supply lines for Europe (“Nord Stream 2”) on 26 September 2022.
Since the inauguration of the 47th POTUS on 20 January 2025, or more precisely after the mutual exchange of unfriendly and often confrontational comments between the US and the EU in the subsequent weeks, the EU has been trying hastily and disconcertedly to work towards more independence within transatlantic relations (and beyond). However, just as questionable as the EU’s open support for the (then) Democratic candidate, Kamala Harris, plus the strong and public caveat against a Trump-II Administration – as justifiable as one may find that from the perspective of European interests - had been during the 2024 US election campaign, so little seem the latest rushing attempts at cutting the umbilical cord, seeking for more independence from the US and NATO, and even considering (national) nuclear armament to be carried by compliance with international law (arg. NPT), by forward-looking realpolitik, strategic pragmatism, and by true Weltpolitikfähigkeit.
Germany’s renowned philosopher Peter Sloterdijk is herewith recalled having written, "the impression suggests itself that the inhabitants of the semi-continent [i.e., Europe] have for some time now been using Odysseus' cunning again in order to retreat into a position of 'nobody' after the sequence of events, called "world history", they triggered. [...] While the middle Europeans between Lisbon and Szczecin are increasingly abandoning themselves into nobody-zation, their enemies from Beijing to Ankara are forming a Polyphemic International" (Peter Sloterdijk in Der Kontinent ohne Eigenschaften). At the realpolitik level of international affairs, the French historian and anthropologist Emmanuel Todd summarizes it more provocatively, "If there is one thing that Russians and Americans currently agree on, it is their assessment of European leadership. In both Washington and Moscow, Europeans are seen as vassals and servants who have lost all ability to act on their own. They are despised." Europe is thus increasingly transforming herself from geopolitical subject to object – with a view to global gravitas, almost as a reversal of her colonial past.
(Message from Mao Zedong to Richard Nixon in 1971 on the occasion of Henry Kissinger’s (secret) shuttle diplomacy and meeting with Zhou Enlai, cited in Henry KISSINGER, Leadership – Six Studies in World Strategy).
In conclusion, the question arises as to how all of this can be summarized, categorized, and evaluated, with an honest and realistic look at the future of multilateralism and of international relations.
• Even though many politicians and experts, particularly in the West, questioned this not so long ago, it can be considered as certain that the unipolar, post-1991 world - with the USA as the leading power - is giving way to a new, genuine multipolarity. A new bipolar order between a USA-affine bloc and a China-led group, which is often put forward as an alternative, seems unlikely, particularly in view of, e.g., India's noticeably clear (opposing) stance in this regard and the likewise perceptible reticence of many other countries in all regions.
• A shift in influence and power is certainly also taking place in the direction towards the Global South, which sees the new upcoming multipolarity - as explained - not as a threat, but as an emancipatory promise. On that note, we may also speak of an anti-colonialism movement 2.0. This time, however, it is less about gaining independence from former colonial powers but more about emancipation from historical dependencies and hegemonies as well as freely positioning oneself on an equal footing on the geopolitical chessboard.
• As much as international dialogue and consultative discourse within the framework of omnilateral or at least multilateral fora are needed, especially in times of great upheaval and disruption, it must be assumed that future international relations and mechanisms thereof will clearly be based on the historical Yalta approach – at least for the foreseeable future: blatant power play by Yalta 2.0 is crushing Helsinki.
• The latter is not only about long-term, geopolitical goals, but also about short-term, strongly economic, and other interest-driven perspectives, trajectories, and - if deemed necessary - also about interventions to this end. Examples of these are - very often incompatible with international law - rampant sanctions policies, the confiscation of foreign state reserves, embargoes and the interruption of financial and investment flows, the threat with and the application of significant tariffs, national outreach by applying transnational jurisdiction, or (other) unilateral coercive measures, e.g., “economic measures taken by one state to compel a change in the policy of another state” (see, e.g., numerous OHCHR resolutions and documents).
• In intergovernmental cooperation, relations will increasingly transform into telolateral transactionism, which may also be driven by individual interests (prestige-laden "deals") and may even be detached from long-term, strategic effects/goals. In doing so, this naturally also means that regional organizations or platforms, such as the European Union, may be deliberately circumvented or bypassed following the Machiavellian approach of divide et impera.
• The BRICS+ format will gain further members and partner countries as a "classic" telolateral platform in its own right and will therefore continue to grow in importance and gravitas. BRICS+ seems to be less concerned with abolishing the existing international rule(s)-based order, but rather with ending its Western leadership and the perceived teleological instrumentalization of this rule(s)-based order by the West, particularly the USA. It would also be wrong to regard BRICS+ as a rival or adversary to the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) or other (regional) organizations. BRICS+ has one clear goal: to end the multidimensional hegemony of the West in the international concert, which is ever more perceived as unjust and outdated.
• In a world that is undergoing tectonic upheavals and in which interest-driven power-play by the major powers (in the broader sense) beyond the previous rules of the game is gaining the upper hand, new potential opportunities (yet, also (existing plus additional) challenges) are arising for regional organizations and regional fora. Opportunities, however, that must also be actively seized and realized in concreto. Such opportunities could manifest themselves, for example, in the urgently needed UN reform; a UN reform that has been under discussion for decades, including fair representation in the UN Security Council. However, a basic prerequisite for the realistic and actual implementation of such reforms would be the active recognition, observance, and application by all Member States of key principles such as "equal rights" among States, known since the Peace of Westphalia and enshrined in the UN Charter – hence, also the political and factual willingness to relinquish existing privileges (for some).
• In addition to the regional platforms, old and new middle powers will increasingly play a decisive role in multipolarity as chess pieces and in moving other chess pieces on the grand chessboard. Besides India, these are in particular Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, some of the GCC states, (still) Iran, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Turkey (among others).
• Furthermore, a certain predictable internal stability of the world's largest country by area (RF) with 11 time zones, “enjoying few natural defensive demarcations and […] with an abiding perception of insecurity essentially derived from the country’s longstanding vulnerability to invasion across the East European plains” (Henry Kissinger in Leadership – Six Studies in World Strategy), her “dual identity as straddling Europe and Asia symbolised by its old imperial motif of the two-headed eagle, its gaze pointing in different directions” (Samir Puri in Westlessness – The Great Global Rebalancing) as well as her, in particular, 6,000 nuclear warheads should also be of supra-regional, i.e., global interest.
• Even the (formerly) de facto unipolar hegemonic power, the USA, will come to terms with the new multipolar reality. In terms of realpolitik, it is likely that the USA - apart from economic and military sabre-rattling in preparation for interest-driven "deals" - will not allow herself to become embroiled in concrete military confrontations on a larger scale. The latter is certainly also on the radar of other (larger) powers, which could give rise to interesting/scaring thinking options about shifting zones of influence, including territorial shifts (and borders).
• The hitherto remarkably close relations between the USA and Europe are becoming increasingly less important, while other regions (such as the Pacific, the Middle East, and major sea routes) are gaining in importance for the USA and other powers. While in recent years the former transatlantic friendship has increasingly manifested itself as a stable, yet quasi-parental relationship of factual (and sometimes cosy) subordination, this relation could – in the worst case - even lead to open confrontation in the future (arg. defence spending, Greenland ambitions, de facto ending the RF-UKR conflict by the USA, unilateral exploration of minerals and rare earth metals, etc.). Apart from the potential lack of willingness to arrive in the realms of factual, geostrategic realpolitik, Europe seems as yet to lack not only the possibility of emancipation, but also the true will (including all necessary implications) to emancipate herself.
• On the Grand Chessboard, Europe also finds herself in a - to some extent self-inflicted - quandary and strategic dilemma: the dependence on an unbalanced transatlantic, but unilaterally crumbling cooperation; the exposure vis-à-vis a rising, southern neighbouring continent with an ongoing demographic explosion and millions of people ready to migrate; the exposure vis-à-vis two geopolitically significant military crises and hotspots in the immediate neighbourhood; economic recession, increasing deindustrialization, demographic ageing, increasingly overburdened social systems; a latent, partly historically based predisposition for tendencies towards self-aggrandizement and moral hubris; a still pronounced Eurocentricity and a questionable centripetal self-perception, summarized by the almost iconic saying of Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar in the course of the 2022 Bratislava Globsec conference, "Europe must get out of the mindset that Europe's problems are our problems, but the world's problems are not Europe's problems"; a political trajectory and decision-makers who not only seem to have forgotten the middle position of a balanced “ethics of responsibility” (Verantwortungsethik) in politics on the spectrum from overly pragmatic realpolitik, on the one hand, to purist “ethics of conviction” (Gesinnungsethik), on the other, but also has led Europe in many areas to the highest regulatory density in global comparison; all this not only weakens and questions the hitherto attractive European "soft power", her "teleological appeal" (Ivan Krastev) and general European credibility, but this Europe - immovably placed on a common landmass and caught in this quandary and strategic dilemma - is also facing a hardened Russian Federation, which - from her own perception - has just endured "three decades of humiliation".
Since the end of the Second World War, there have been on average around 120 to 150 armed conflicts at any one time, many of them of an interstate nature. Yet, the European Union has chosen to selectively focus on ascribing an almost diabolical pariah status to the Russian Federation and has clearly positioned herself with consequent coercive measures to this day. This is by no way to question the illegality of this war of aggression under international law; but the EU has apparently been much more reluctant to take countermeasures in other (past and/or contemporary) conflict zones or against other severe violations of international law. Therefore, it can neither be assumed that the RF will display a high degree of amnesia in her future relations with Europe, nor that Europe - unlike the USA - has the inherent gravitas to humiliation-overruling, telolateral power-play.
• In view of the Trump administration's recent deliberations and threats to withdraw from NATO and the United Nations, the bells of alarm are ringing in Europe. The European Commission and individual Member States are considering implementing an armaments package worth several hundred billion in the near future. But military spending alone will not suffice. With the exception of Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states, Europe's post-heroic societies seem to lack the will to defend themselves and they do (substantially) lack military personnel and capabilities in concreto. In short, Europe would need to “trim its welfare state to build a warfare state” (Financial Times, 05 March 2025). In a first realistic step towards achieving reasonable defence capability, this would mean not only the spending of billions but reintroducing compulsory military service for both men and women (besides all the other necessary, long-term capacity building measures). It is doubtful whether, firstly, the political courage exists and prevails for such steps and, secondly, if there is the actual will – including the inherent consequences - to (physically) defend one’s country in the first place.
• The often strained, frequently propagated and matter-of-factly so important rule(s)-based international order is facing tough times. International law also seems to be increasingly confined to a niche in a karstified biotope. Both on a large scale - see the many wars in flagrant violation of international law and the countless war crimes committed in many places in recent years and decades - and on a small scale - exemplified by the incoming German Chancellor's announcement to openly circumvent a judicially confirmed arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC) – are those subject to the rules authorizing "blind spots" or open "exceptions" on their own initiative. With all this, however, Pandora's box and its inherent temptations are also gaining an increasingly dangerous prominence (and ultimately frequency). This would make a revival of genuine international – in particular omnilateral - dialogue, the primacy of diplomacy, and the strengthening of omnilateral platforms such as the United Nations all the more important. However, the growing process of de-democratization within societies, also from a global perspective, appears to be spreading to the tender shoots of those in international relations.
• The world will not be short of flashpoints and conflicts in the coming years:
o The Middle East, with the increased interest and involvement of the USA, the different interests, and rivalries among the states there, including such within the Muslim ummah, and the endeavours of several states and other stakeholders to preserve/acquire nuclear weapons and nuclear guarantees, will remain one of the dangerous hotspots; a flashpoint that is also likely to lead to further territorial, de facto border shifts.
o The Taiwan issue is a central concern for Beijing's national self-image and, from a geostrategic perspective, also for the USA and NATO. Under the current Chinese President Xi Jinping at the latest, reunification has been declared a national priority, which is to be implemented by the 100th anniversary of the "Modern China", i.e., 01 October 2049 at the latest, but in all likelihood before then. In any case, the Taiwan issue will certainly come up, and no one should be surprised then - as some seemingly were in the RF-UKR conflict (without seeking to compare and judge the two situations qualitatively). Argues the former UNSC President, Singapore Diplomat Kishore Mahbubani just recently in an interview, “The most dangerous issue by now is the Taiwan issue. […] Taiwan […] is a very hot potato geopolitically because it is the last living symbol of the century of humiliation. […] From the Chinese point of view, until Taiwan is reunified the century of humiliation has not been closed.”
o In view of global warming, not only will the existing, important waterways (e.g., Panama Canal, Suez Canal) continue to play a crucial role in the geographical context, but the so-called Northeast Passage between the Atlantic and Pacific via the North (Arctic) will become of very high geostrategic importance. The first clear signs of this have already emerged in view of Trump's aspirations for Greenland, which "controls" several relevant sea routes from and to that passage.
o Not so much for reasons of global warming, but rather "political warming", a new Iron Curtain - with all its political, economic, social, and military consequences - will emerge and persist (at least for the mid-term perspective) between the western part of Europe and her east, i.e., a (de facto extended, if it was) Russian Federation and Belarus. It can be assumed that such a contact line (cease fire line, “border”) - despite the negative consequences for the Euro-Asian region - will not be seen as negative per se by all geopolitical players. However, Europe will be additionally weakened in substance and on multiple dimensions as a result.
o Finally, there will also be increasingly more fierce competition, straightforward rivalry, however also unexpected telolateral purpose partnerships in the technical sphere (such as the digital world/order, quantum technology, artificial intelligence, military technology, computer chips, (alternative) forms of energy, etc.), in cyber and information space, in outer space, and for raw materials (especially rare earth metals).
Humanity is facing major challenges, and the current Zeitenwende is far more complex, far-reaching, and multidimensional than many - some seemingly still in a well-saturated garden or island mentality - would like to admit and realize. William Shakespeare lets his characters speak in Julius Caesar,
"The sun of Rome is set.
Our day is gone.
Clouds, dews, and dangers come."
We can only hope that the last word of the subsequent sentence, as in the original, is also intoned with a "d" instead of a "g" for reality,
"... our deeds are done."
Despite the current multidimensional disruptions, all these challenges can and shall ultimately - if it is to be reasonably peaceful - only be met and overcome by international discourse, by mutual balancing and reconciliation of interests, by willingness for revitalized and genuine omnilateralism (or similar multilateralism of previous diction). Ultimately, this offers hope and prospects for emancipation and prosperity - possibly and ideally for all chess pieces at the (grand) global chessboard.
About the author:
Martin Kreutner is spiritus rector, First Dean (emeritus), and (fmr) Head of the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA), an intergovernmental organization and post-secondary educational institution. He has worked more than two decades in international affairs was President of the CoE/EU network European Partners Against Corruption (EPAC/EACN) for almost a decade. As a (fmr) military officer, he spent five years with different international UN and PfP field missions. He holds a law degree (AUT) and a master’s degree in security studies (UK). He is member to various boards and lectures at numerous universities and academies in Europe and beyond. Mr. Kreutner was recognized twice by Ethisphere (USA) as one of 100 Most Influential People in Business Ethics., inter alia the IFIMES Advisory Board.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.
Ljubljana/Vienna, 26 March 2025
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives”, link: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] This article was written in the thematic context of the NSM (New School of Multilateralism) and will also be published in its academic, fully referenced, and extended version in book form in mid-2025. This article, thus, does not claim to be an academic paper, but it also contains elements of a political commentary, as the subtitle implies. This is accompanied nolens volens by personal value judgements, which the author clearly identifies as exclusively his own and assumes the associated responsibility. For editorial reasons, the article covers developments up until 01 March 2025, approximately two weeks after the Munich Security Conference 2025 (MSC 2025) and one day after the more than confrontational press conference between Presidents Donald Trump (USA) and Vladimir Zelensky (UKR), plus Vice-President J.D. Vance (USA). It can therefore only take account of events and processes up to this date, which in a world of constant developments, disruptions, and the increasing application of “politics by ad hoc wrecking balls” in international relations, all of which too often come thick and fast every day, must be seen as an unfortunate but obvious limitation for the desired up-to-datedness.
Furthermore, it is explicitly confirmed that all the work - with the exception of the marked, referenced parts - is the sole work of the author and that no AI (such as ChatGPT or similar programmes) has been used for it.
Quotations from German were translated into English (UN style) by the author or, where deemed relevant, with the assistance of translation software (DeepL), the results of which were double-checked again by the author.
