The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, constantly analyses events in the regions of the Middle East and the Balkans. Ambassador Dr Jožef Kunic, President of Slovenian Association for International Relations (SDMO) and member of IFIMES has analysed current events after the Parliamentary elections in Croatia. The most important sections from the comprehensive analysis are given below:
The elections were carried out in Croatia on Sunday, 23 November 2003. HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), once presided over by Franjo Tudjman, which advocates the national values and sovereignty, won 66 seats in the 152-seat parliament. The right-wing HSS (Croatian Peasant Party) won 10 seats, the radical-right HSP (Croatian Party of Right) won 8 seats and the other parties will hold 14 seats. The decisive victory of the right-wing is the result of voters' opinion that the left option, if it can be called so, did not meet the expectations set at the elections four years ago. It is interesting that the sound economic results did not play the key role in the decision making at the polling places. It is also interesting that in its election campaign the previous leading coalition did not emphasise the economic results as would have been expected. Instead it was more and more inclined to the national zeal, which is the main element of right-wing parties, and eventually became even subordinated, at least apparently, to this element. In spite of initial firm intentions to respect the demands of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) it was not able to send any suspects to the Hague. The pressures of the right opposition were too strong and influenced a large part of the nation so the national feelings became more and more powerful. On the other hand, its predecessor, Tudjman's HDZ, had sent a round dozen of suspects to the Hague since it was not forced to prove its national orientation by rejecting the Tribunal's demands. Even in the economic field the previous leading coalition was not able to function without the nationally conscious feelings. When the public invitation to tender was put out for the purchase of the hotel complex »Suncani Hvar«, located on one of the most beautiful Adriatic islands, the Slovenian offer was the most favourable one from all the viewpoints. But for the sole reason of its being a Slovenian offer it provoked national discussions in the coalition and the Slovenians were not allowed to invest. The left-wing coalition slackened in defending the so called national interests also regarding the border with Slovenia. The already concluded international agreement, which is in my opinion favourable to both parties and even more favourable to Croatia than to Slovenia, was not ratified in Croatia.
Although the elections in Croatia in 1999 raised good signs that Croatia would show a great deal of readiness and good will to resolve the open issues with Slovenia and that co-operation would improve in all the fields, these proved to be only vain hopes. Croatia did not ratify the agreement on succession of the former SFRY which would resolve the majority of problems related to the heritage of the former Yugoslavia and is important for all the newly established states in the territory of the former SFRY. Neither did Croatia ratify the agreement on the border with Slovenia although it was initialled by both parties. The Croatian media have not forgotten the issue of holders of savings deposited with Ljubljanska banka which the Slovenian side believes to be part of the succession agreement. Furthermore, the problem of the Krško Nuclear Power Plant has not been resolved yet. Slovenia is not treated equally when it comes to foreign investments on the grounds of unresolved problem of the debt of Ljubljanska banka. The declaration of ecological and fishing zone by Croatia just prior to the November elections without Slovenia's consent and thus prejudicing the state border was the last »right« step of the »left« government. The slackening gave wings to the rightists and disappointed the leftists which was proven by the latest election results.
Moreover, Croatia has several other open issues with its neighbouring countries. It has to lay down the border with Serbia and Montenegro on the river Danube. The riverbed, the middle of which represents in principle the border line between the former republics and now states, is constantly changing and will not correspond for ever to the cadastral map. The river Danube has formed thirteen bends and if the border line was drawn along the middle of the stream the newly formed land would belong to the other state and Croatia would loose about 11,5 hectares. Another border issue is the Prevlaka Peninsula at the Adriatic Sea. This is the area of strategic importance since it is the entrance control point for the Boka Kotorska naval port of Serbia and Montenegro. Although the problem has been soothed, it still remains open. Furthermore, the Serbs who fled Croatia during the military operations in the Krajina region represent a large and potentially very serious problem for Croatia. All those who are now in Serbia and Montenegro represent certain economic burden for this state and sooner or later they will demand the right to their property, compensation etc. The problem is far from being resolved and is probably about to start aggravating.
Croatia has also numerous unresolved issues with Bosnia and Herzegovina which are the remnants of the Tudjman reign. The most important are the agreement on the port of Ploce, the Kostajnica border and the Neum crossing. The most difficult issue is the border at the river Una in the Bosanska Kostajnica area. Although it has been formally resolved, the inhabitants oppose those solutions. And finally, another two open issues should be pointed out: The relation of official Zagreb with Herzegovina and the Serbian refugees who fled from Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia regarded the position of Herzegovina as the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina which is, of course, not the real situation. There is no doubt that the influence of Croatia on Herzegovina was significant and some analysts even described it as interference of Croatia in the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The question is to what extent such relationship with a neighbouring state was exceeded. As regards the Serbian refugees, this represents a very complex problem since the same questions will probably be raised by Bosnia and Herzegovina and by Serbia and Montenegro.
Unfortunately, it is very clear that Croatia deals relatively slowly with unresolved issues which are the remnants of the former SFRY or which resulted from the wars during the 1990s. Croatia's geostrategic position is exceptional and that is why it would be of immense importance for the whole region to resolve the open issues with the neighbouring states much faster, with much more understanding for the problems or the goals of the neighbouring states and with much more co-operation in resolving the issues concerning Croatia and its neighbours at the same time. As an important state in the region, Croatia should function as the stabiliser of the region and not as the centre of unresolved issues. The EU and NATO policy should be oriented towards encouraging the guidelines leading as soon as possible to a stable region in which Croatia as a stabiliser could represent an important factor.
Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the unresolved issues with Slovenia differ from the unresolved issues with other neighbouring states since in May 2004 Slovenia is to become a full member of the EU and a full member of NATO. Consequently, the issues concerning Slovenia automatically become in a way the issues concerning the EU and NATO.
Surely, the goal of Croatia is to join the European Union as soon as possible. All the major parties adhere to this goal and in practice there is a national consensus regarding this issue. Many orientations and decisions will be devoted to this dominant goal. Croatia will have to prove in many fields its proEuropean orientation which is in diametrical opposition to persisting in great sovereignty, adopting decisions concerning neighbouring countries without their consent (the ecological and fishing zone being a typical example) and favouring very dubious rights over parts of the territory including the sea (such as the sea border with Slovenia) instead of good long-term relations, which have been long since outmoded practice in the EU. ProEuropean policy is definitely not congruent with revoking public invitations to tender for investments which apply to all except to those coming from certain nations (as in case of »Suncani Hvar«). ProEuropean attitude in resolving the refugee issue will be very difficult but just formal adoption of solutions without any real effects is not what we could call the European approach. ProEuropean orientation will also have to be proven in case of the suspects of the Hague Tribunal. The ostrich policy towards this issue will have to be modified. Showing respect to the issue of real estate whose owners are from other states in the territory of the former SFRY is another example of proving proEuropean policy, as is the reconstruction of the demolished synagogue.
Croatia is aware that the present enlargement of the EU to the ten new member states is a very hard nut to crack. Facing the new constitution with new realities such as the »New« and the »Old« Europe or the »Europe of greater speed«, new economic flows etc., the EU will require a transitional period of certain duration. Despite the formal assurances that the door to the EU is open, the new enlargement will be practically impossible before the consolidation of the Europe of the twenty-five. Croatia's turn to join the EU might therefore be together with the other states of the West Balkans. Such waiting is surely not in the interest of Croatia. This is also one of the reasons for strengthened relations with the USA which are evident from the position of the representatives of the future Croatia's leading crew towards the participation in Iraq. Croatia certainly relies upon the effect of American support in its accession to the EU.
Croatia's goal is also to join the NATO alliance as soon as possible. However, many open issues in the region and disrespect for the demands of the Hague Tribunal will definitely not accelerate the accession to this defence organisation.
Most analysts believe that Croatia will behave acceptably towards the EU and that it will agree to the European principles and do everything to be able to take the shortest path to the EU. It will be very loyal to those European states which are important and old members expecting them to pose very few obstacles in its accession to the EU. The new crew will not have to prove its loyalty to the national values and sovereignty at every step and will therefore adopt much more easily the decisions expected by the EU. It will send the suspects to the Hague with much more ease, open the real estate market, adopt, at least formally, the resolutions required by the EU regarding the refugee issue etc. It will make effort not to be in the package with the other states of the West Balkans when joining the EU since it would represent a failure for Croatia. It those efforts it will try to rely on the European governments where there is the right-wing majority which could help Croatia significantly unless it disappoints them by some non-proEuropean decisions.
Croatia will be loyal towards the USA and will strengthen its co-operation. The right-wing winning party even offered participation of Croatian soldiers in Iraq which is, though only symbolically, an important political stroke. Another advantage of the new crew in the relations with the USA is that its leading members have no communist background.
The new Croatia's Prime Minister Ivo Sanader stated that the priorities of the new government regarding foreign affairs will be joining the EU, joining the NATO and relations with the neighbouring states.
The latter represent the most interesting issue. According to the European expectations Croatia should carry out a constructive policy in relations with the regional states of the West Balkans. The open issues with the neighbouring states should be resolved constructively, with appropriate understanding, laying stress on the goal of resolving the problems (and not gaining direct benefits), which would enable Croatia to become the stabiliser in the region. Can Croatia achieve this? The success is far from self-evident. The nationalistic and populistic pressures with stressed national symbols were very often an important factor in adopting certain decisions. The EU should take up a clear position on this issue, possibly that the good relations of neighbouring states are more important than minor, sometimes only symbolic benefits. Preferably, the USA should take up the position that Croatia should become the stabiliser in the region, which is only possible with properly regulated relations with the neighbouring states.
The essential questions for Slovenia are: What policy can be expected from the new Croatian government and the parliament towards Slovenia? What relations can be expected between the two states and how can Slovenia influence those relations?
Another question posed by the analysts is in what way and in relation to whom the new government will meet the more decisive expectations of Croatian voters, especially as regards the preservation of sovereignty and national values.
Many analysts believe that Slovenia will be the main safety valve for levelling the nationalistic pressures. In their opinion it will be necessary to show Croatian voters in some political fields that their expectations regarding the national values will be at least partly realised. Since Croatia will definitely not realise those patriotic expectations in relations with the EU, the Hague Tribunal, the other states of the West Balkans nor with the USA, it will compensate by placing even more stress on the relations with Slovenia. Some analysts believe that the relations with Slovenia will be somewhat radicalised while others even predict extremely unfavourable national attitude of official Zagreb towards Slovenia. They do not see any possibility for Croatia to consent to the finally valid agreement on the state border without international arbitration. In their opinion, the issue of holders of savings deposited with Ljubljanska banka will be intensified, there will be fishing incidents, Slovenian companies will not find it easy to invest in Croatia and it will be difficult to consult Croatia on a number of questions.
However, in my opinion this is not the only possibility. On 1 May 2004, Slovenia will become a full member of the EU although it is de facto already in this association of states. At that point it will become also a full member of NATO which will put additional weight to this state. There is a realistic possibility that although the opinion polls did not show very strong friendship of Croatians towards Slovenia, the Croatian politics will regard Slovenia in fact as part of the EU and that Croatia will assume the same position towards Slovenia as towards the other members of the EU and Brussels.
The latter possibility is surely more favourable for Slovenia and will be advocated by the rational and calm part of Croatian politics. Many people in Croatia are aware that Slovenia will always be their neighbour and that in the long run Croatia can not benefit from the Balkan principle, according to which the direct benefit gained to the detriment of the neighbour is more important than good relations with the neighbour.
However, we are far from being certain that Croatia will decide to establish European relations with its north-west neighbour. Old states with traditional diplomacy and national interests in the field of foreign relations already »inherent in the little brain« are usually immune from the daily political events and relatively frequent changes of the leading crews. On the other hand, this is not the case in young European states where a change in the political option has a strong influence on both the domestic and foreign policy and it would not be realistic to expect foreign relations not to depend on the election results.
In order to achieve the above mentioned second possibility in relations of Croatia to Slovenia, the latter will also have to spare no efforts. The recommendation from the first talks with the President of the Republic of Slovenia, Dr Janez Drnovsek, in November 2003 was: »The future Slovenian foreign policy should be creative and not only responsive.«
Only a dialogue between the two states can lead to the desired goal. The dialogue should be carried out in a friendly atmosphere where the participants establish mutual trust and respect. Politics was and will always be created by people with their little but important human features. After the new government is established in Croatia, both countries should start intensive talks. Resorting to international arbitrage, although not opposed in principle by any party, does not bring long-term benefits. It is very likely that one or both parties would be very unsatisfied with the decision of the arbitrage and that would not represent a sound basis for good long-term relations between the neighbouring states and for strengthening regional co-operation.
The dialogue should be intensive in should be carried out at all levels with all Croatian political options. However, the dialogue, i.e. the talks carried out by two parties, should not exclude or replace the active role in international organisations and in the multilateral field.
Both parties should be able to understand the problems of the other party and Slovenia should persist on the issues of relevance for this country, for it seems that Croatia has been more persistent than Slovenia till now.
A prior uniform view should be assumed by Slovenia on all the arguments, not only by the politicians and diplomats but also, and as far as possible, by the experts. The interpretation and application of generally valid principles should be consistent and oriented to the benefit of Slovenia. Namely, if expert opinions delivered in public differ they do not enable credible representation of the positions.
Slovenia should strengthen public diplomacy, i.e. the diplomatic activity encompassing wider circles of people in Croatia, especially the interested groups. This activity should be intensified in order to change the public opinion and achieve favourable attitude of the general public.
The international community, especially the EU and the USA, should demand Croatia to take active steps to realise the demands of the Hague Tribunal and to help the refugees return to their homes de facto and not only de iure. This will only be possible if Croatia reduces the populistic rhetoric on the national or so called patriotic basis. Consequently, the populistic pressures on the foreign policy activities of the new government will also be reduced which will enable a temperate, rational and tolerant dialogue and solutions to the satisfaction of both parties which is the basis for stable and good long-term relations in the region.
Now is the time for the international community and Slovenia to prepare for and start as soon as possible a dialogue with the new government and new leading crew in Croatia. The first steps are very important. A good start is half the battle.
