The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly conducts analyses of events spanning the Middle East, the Balkans, and global affairs. In anticipation of the second round of the presidential elections in the Republic of Croatia, scheduled for 12 January 2025, IFIMES has prepared an analysis of this final stage of the election campaign. From the extensive analysis titled “Presidential elections in Croatia 2025: A choice between ‘constitutional’ and ‘false’ patriotism,” we present the most important and engaging insights.
The first round of the eighth presidential elections in the Republic of Croatia was held on 29 December 2024. There were 3,762,224 eligible voters, who cast their votes at 6,755 polling stations in Croatia and abroad. The voter turnout was 46.03%. The President of the Republic of Croatia is elected based on universal and equal suffrage, in direct elections by secret ballot, for a five-year term. The territory of the Republic of Croatia, including polling stations outside its borders, forms a single electoral constituency.
The results of the first round of the presidential elections in the Republic of Croatia are: ● Zoran Milanović 49.09% (797,938), ● Dragan Primorac 19.35% (314,663), ● Marija Selak Raspudić 9.25% (150,435), ● Ivana Kekin 8.89% (144,533), ● Tomislav Jonjić 5.09% (82,787), ● Miro Bulj 3.82% (62,127), ● Branka Lozo 2.41% (39,321), and ● Niko Tokić Kartelo 0.88% (14,409).
In the second round of the elections, scheduled for 12 January 2025, the candidates are Zoran Milanović (Social Democratic Party of Croatia – SDP and partners) and Dragan Primorac (Croatian Democratic Union – HDZ and partners).
These presidential elections conclude a super election year that has seen European, parliamentary, and presidential elections. They also serve as the final test of political strength and the (re)positioning of key political actors ahead of the upcoming local elections on 18 May 2025.
One notable feature of Croatia’s presidential elections is the lack of an election campaign, which is unusual for presidential contests. The incumbent President and candidate, Zoran Milanović, has chosen to ignore HDZ's candidate, Dragan Primorac, viewing Prime Minister and HDZ leader Andrej Plenković as his true opponent. As a result, the campaign lacks gravitas and a statesmanlike tone, instead leaning more towards entertainment. This reinforces claims that Croatia is still not a mature and stable democracy, which is at odds with its status as a member of the EU, NATO, the eurozone, and the Schengen Area.
The wave of mass emigration from Croatia has "taken" more young lives than the Second World War and the Homeland War combined. This is the continuation of a second exodus systematically caused by HDZ. The first targeted Serbs during the final military operations of the war, while the second affects Croats for economic reasons – through the destruction of the national economy and social fabric.
Milanović insists on "constitutional" patriotism and the fight against crime and corruption, while Primorac promotes "false" patriotism, a hallmark of HDZ's traditional rhetoric. HDZ embodies false patriotism, which has devastated and depopulated Croatia, while creating numerous problems, such as tycoonisation, the privileged status of war veterans and the Roman Catholic Church, and unilateral interference in neighbouring countries, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the pretext of the constitutional clause on protecting Croats living abroad. This approach aligns with Croatia’s misuse of EU membership, leveraging it to address bilateral disputes with neighbouring EU candidate countries. Furthermore, it is important to note Croatian misuse of EU funds, which has prompted investigations by the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), headed by Laura Codruța Kövesi.
Milanović emphasises that his election platform is centred on the constitution, respect for constitutional principles, and the pursuit of a fairer society. He claims that Andrej Plenković and HDZ have "stolen" the institutions of the Croatian state and failed to respect the constitution.
Milanović enjoys the support of parties and individuals across the ideological spectrum, while Primorac noticeably lacks backing from HDZ and Prime Minister Andrej Plenković. There is a sense that HDZ has sidelined Primorac, distancing itself from him to ensure that his potential defeat in the presidential elections is not perceived as a loss for the party or for Plenković personally, which could signal the beginning of the end of Plenković’s leadership era.
Zoran Milanović has faced criticism for his lacklustre leadership of Croatia’s government between 2011 and 2016. As Prime Minister, he frequently demonstrated arrogance, both at home and on the international stage. His rhetoric towards Serbia and his stance on events in Bosnia and Herzegovina were equally harsh. There is an expectation that Milanović has since become more politically mature and will deliver on some of the promises hoped for by progressive forces in Croatia, the region, and Europe.
Dragan Primorac’s greatest liability is his participation in the government of Prime Minister Ivo Sanader (HDZ), where he served as Minister of Health. That government was riddled with corruption, with no fewer than seven ministers, including Sanader himself, facing criminal charges. This association weighs heavily on Primorac in the current election campaign, as HDZ is the only political party in Croatia to have been legally convicted of corruption. Ivo Sanader was convicted of multiple criminal offences, initially receiving a six-year prison sentence, which is likely to be consolidated into a 10-year term of imprisonment. Adding to the criticism, Primorac faces scrutiny for owning private medical clinics, earning him the label of a healthcare tycoon in Croatia. He has spent four times more than Milanović in the campaign to date.
Croatia's foreign policy towards the region is, according to analysts, outdated and misaligned with the principles of the EU. Within the EU, this approach resonates with radical right-wing circles, given Croatia’s position bordering the Western Balkans. In their vision, Croatia should become a staging ground for political and other actions. Good neighbourly relations are key to future progress, as neither Slovenia nor Serbia, let alone Bosnia and Herzegovina or Montenegro, objectively pose a threat to Croatia. The greatest danger to Croatia stems from its own destructive policies, positioning the country as a base for potentially controversial actions. Equally concerning are its internal economic and security challenges. Croatia's internal instability and ongoing crisis are the main factors behind its flawed foreign policy, which relies heavily on Russian money and influence.
Russian interference in the region and in the country has brought Croatia into the spotlight of American policy and NATO. Heightened American focus is expected to become the only corrective factor for Croatia’s flawed approach to the Western Balkans. For this reason, reports from Croatia’s security and intelligence sector should be taken with caution and a healthy dose of scepticism.
There are no substantial differences between the candidates regarding the region. Both share similar positions and actions towards Serbia, which is still perceived in Croatia as a potential danger and threat, often exploited for domestic political purposes. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague ruled in five cases that the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was international in nature, identified Croatia as an aggressor, and confirmed the existence of a Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) involving Croatia.
There is also no fundamental difference between Milanović and Primorac regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, as both endorse the creation of a third (Croatian) entity and view the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a Croatian 'province.' While Primorac aligns with HDZ’s policy on Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the SDP there is no majority support for its partition or for the policy advocated by Milanović regarding BiH.
Croatia continues to fabricate the threat of migrants and the alleged Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina while attempting to obscure the real danger of 'soft' Russian influence and the very 'hard' billions of euros being absorbed into Croatia’s financial and economic systems. It has been noted that Croatia’s security and intelligence agencies are not sufficiently engaged in tracking Russian influence and financial flows within the country. The Croatian leadership maintains close ties with Russians and Milorad Dodik, adopting a protective stance towards him and consistently shielding him from EU sanctions.
Croatia blocked Montenegro’s EU negotiation process and declared certain Montenegrin leaders persona non grata over the adoption of a resolution on Jasenovac, the former concentration camp for Jews, Serbs, Roma, and anti-fascists during the era of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH).
Analysts believe that Croatia needs to revise its policy towards the Western Balkans, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. The current policy generates resistance, strains regional relations, and hampers the European integration process, creating persistent frustrations that are increasingly recognised in Brussels and within the EU.
Germany contributes the most money to the EU budget, while depending on the calculation method, the largest recipients are Croatia and Poland. Germany pays over 20 billion euros more into the EU budget than it receives, while France contributes over 10 billion euros more than it gets back. In total, ten EU member states contribute more to the common EU budget than they withdraw, while 17 member states receive more than they pay in.
The contributions of EU member states to the EU budget are based on their population size and economic strength. An analysis of the share of gross national income (GNI) each country contributes places Germany firmly in the first place, at 0.58% of its GNI. By this criterion, the largest net recipient is Croatia, which receives as much as 3.08% of its total GNI from the EU, amounting to over five billion euros annually. This vividly illustrates that Croatia continues to depend heavily on EU funds and the contributions of its taxpayers.
In 2019, the European Commission ceased publishing statistics on net recipients and contributors, as these figures often provoked debate, with numbers from independent research frequently diverging from official EU reports. This discrepancy underscores a lack of transparency and suggests systematic efforts to obscure how EU taxpayers’ money is spent—an issue that demands a more thorough and detailed investigation. Transparency in the use of EU taxpayers’ money is essential, leaving no room for systematic concealment or the so-called “European secrets” by the European Commission.
The election campaign has been dominated by insults, accusations, disinformation, and a lack of meaningful debates, characterised by personal attacks rather than clearly articulated political content. Only one televised debate has been held, lacking any substantive programmatic confrontation. The candidates have not sufficiently addressed issues of foreign policy and national security, even though foreign affairs, the security-intelligence and defence sectors are important parts of the president’s responsibilities. The public impression is that Milanović and Primorac are running for the position of governor in one of Croatia’s 20 counties, rather than for the presidency of the country.
Analysts believe that in the second round of the presidential elections in the Republic of Croatia, the incumbent president Zoran Milanović is likely to achieve a convincing victory, despite largely abstaining from the election campaign. However, his re-election will not ease the burden of Croatia’s complex and strained internal relations, particularly within the state leadership. Milanović must remain steadfast in championing constitutional patriotism and reclaiming the “stolen” institutions of the Croatian state from HDZ. Any deviation from this course risks steering Croatia towards the "Latin Americanisation" of the state, with unforeseeable consequences, instead of fostering a modern and prosperous country grounded in the rule of law, civil liberties, and citizens’ rights.
Ljubljana/Bruxelles/Zagreb, 10 January 2025
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives”, link: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
