International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses developments in the Middle East, Balkans and around the world. Anant Mishra, Visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales, and Dr. Christian Kaunert, Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, prepared comprehensive analysis entitled “Predicting Taliban’s grip on power in Afghanistan for FY 2024-25” in which the authors examine the impact of the Taliban's rule in Afghanistan.
As the Taliban celebrates three years of reign, global powers/regional neighbours are forced to ponder (just like the authors) the regime’s sustained grip to power, which appears to strengthen with every passing year. In these three years, the Supreme Leader (Emir) Haibatullah Akhundzada has strengthened his grip to power, formulating new federal institutions functioning under his decree and implementing policies from his tightly lipped office in Kandahar. Under his leadership, the regime (since 2022) has been focusing on preferring Taliban leaders from the south, appointing them in key positions (from Provincial to Federal), and opening doors in the military command ranks since May 2023. With the nation suffering from chronic food insecurity, impacts of climate change and severe economic hardship (with more than 95% of Afghans under extreme poverty, according to a Kabul-based scholar), the Taliban government appears to manage the economic crisis, even reversing some impact, a claim made by a high-ranking Taliban leader within the Afghan Ministry of Economy, during authors discussion.
That said, power economies, such as Russia and China, have intensified their engagement with the Taliban regime in the last three years, a trend which appears to increase in the remainder of 2024-25. Yet, Islamabad’s engagement with the Taliban reflects serious mistrust and dissatisfaction, exclusively from the group’s inability to take formidable action against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which, according to one Karachi-based scholar, claims to have active bases in the eastern and southeastern parts of Afghanistan, with two camps at the Wesh-Chaman border crossing. As the Taliban continues to indulge in grave human rights violations and ethnic discrimination amidst sustained abuse of Afghan women, New Delhi’s policy towards Afghanistan—besides expressing concerns for the well-being of local Afghans—to date reflects an impasse in its engagement with the Taliban regime.
Today, the Taliban leadership (particularly the Rahbari shura) has significant representation from radical Islamists (Talibs), one being the Emir Akhundzada himself. In three years, there has been some increase in the representation of pragmatists, who no longer vocalise the implementation of Sharia in its truest essence and instead display moral restraints towards the implementation of the Sharia or during such discussions at the shura. They also continue to express the necessity to engage with the West, with few members advocating for a sustained dialogue with regional neighbors and global powers in the presence of the Emir. With few numbers in the shura, the pragmatists appear to have made no impact on the Emir’s policies and seem to have even distanced themselves from confronting/challenging his decision, limiting their consultations purely in the interest of Afghanistan.
In May 2023, Emir Akhundzada restructured his council of advisers, handpicking military commanders (mullahs) from Southern Afghanistan (Kandahar, Helmand and Nimroz) preferring the likes of Khairullah Khairkhwa and Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Omari among others, to counter the influence of Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, keeping a check on their loyalty by nominating preferred deputy’s (Mullah Mohammad Fazl and Abdul Qayyum Zakir) across critical ministries and regime’s directorates. Forfeiting its traditional societal architecture and hierarchy (the concept of warlords, political class with the elites), the Taliban regime refrains from going back to the old ways, with some leaders comparing the old structures with the defeatist mindset of the erstwhile Islamic Republic, while some credits it to the presence of Türkiye and Qatari politico-military advisers, with a mission to ‘reform’ the regime. Even then, the Emir continues to remove non-Pashtun Talib leaders from the ranks in federal directorates and provincial governments, isolating some to non-functional appointments in the least favored ministries.
That said, since April 2023, the Emir has continued to make serious efforts towards strengthening the role of local actors. His decree of May 2023 points towards establishing a governing council to:
a) Monitor the engagement of local leaders with Afghans,
b) Cater to the queries of inclusivity in the regime’s decisions without hostility,
c) Resolve local conflicts with just,
To that end, the decree established Ulema councils, now functional in roughly all provinces of the country. Monitored by the Emir directly, the council has been given extraordinary powers to address the issue of violations as per the Sharia law, which significantly curbed freedom of expression while increasing the arrest of former Islamic Republic employees or sympathizers. The councils have reinforced apartheid against Afghan women — strictly monitoring the ban on girls’ education (beyond primary school) and extending the punishment to even the family members of those violating travel restrictions (exclusively for women). On the discussion of Sharia’s staunch interpretation, one Taliban leader stated that Emir Akhundzada remained firm on his decision even during conversations with other Islamic scholars and religious clerics (from Central Asia and Middle Eastern countries) requesting him for more significant relaxations on women's rights.
Taking note of Emir Akhundzada’s mandates (travel restrictions for Afghan women) since January 2024, public executions (including stoning) have been significantly curbed, pointing towards serious discontent among senior leadership over such practices.
Although the Afghan economy continues to experience severe shocks from the Western sanctions, the collapse of Afghanistan’s economy is nowhere near what was anticipated by many scholars. According to a World Bank official, Afghanistan’s economy is ‘expected to hover around no-growth territory for the FY 2024-25’, reflecting stagnancy rather than stability. That said, Afghanistan’s economy remains fragile and purely dependent on external aid, with the absence of private sector or government incentives to provide immediate relief to at least half of the population in immediate need of humanitarian support. In a discussion with a former World Bank economist, he pointed out Afghanistan’s growth to have potentially hinging on human capital. With girls devoid of secondary education and half of boys out of school, the human capital situation remains dire. Since most teachers in the secondary schools follow Turkish or Qatari curriculum, Afghanistan will not grow if education itself becomes a subject of import.
With the decline in international aid reflecting the West’s distrust for the Taliban, Beijing and Moscow appear to be the last resort for seeking humanitarian assistance.
The Taliban has effectively curbed corruption, especially at the provincial and local levels, increasing revenue. For the FY 2023-24, regional trade with Pakistan proved beneficial, resulting in an increase in coal and mineral experts to the immediate neighbor (Pakistan) among other regional economies, culminating in Afghan exports of over $1.9 billion. According to a Kabul-based economist, exports appear to shrink in FY 2024-25.
Taking the context of the much-hyped/widely analyzed Taliban’s ban on poppy, the cultivation (combining eastern, southern and parts of north Afghanistan) dropped by over 95%. But it drove significant local Afghans into unemployment. According to one expert, the poppy ban destroyed over 700,000 jobs at various levels (from cultivation to processing and supply chain), costing the Afghan economy a loss of over $1.5 billion. The Emir’s decision, however, proved of great value to the likes of Sirajuddin Haqqani (the Haqqani family combined), skyrocketing the value of pure heroine in the markets of the Middle East and Africa. However, according to one estimate, the Haqqani family is showing signs of struggle in identifying stable markets (in the Middle East, largely due to the Israel-Hamas war). If the battle continues and stockpiles of pure heroine remains unsold, especially under the current ban, a possible rift may appear between the Haqqani family and the Emir. This could open the door for pro-Emir factions to dominate influential clans such as the Haqqani’s, potentially drawing a wedge in the Shura. This wedge could draw southern clans into a potential civil war with pro-Emir factions if mature.
For varied reasons, regional economies appear to engage with the Taliban fruitfully. There have been talks over the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) Gas pipeline, which does not appear stagnant, as stated by many experts. Regional economies appear to engage with the Taliban quite frequently over the Central Asia-South Asia renewable energy infrastructure construction project (CASA-1000) with a target to bring over 1,300 megawatts of surplus electricity from Central Asian economies to South Asia by creating new energy infrastructure projects, with critical infrastructures on the verge of completion in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan.
For the FY-2024-25, the authors foresee diverse international engagements between regional economies and the Taliban, with some economic partnerships delivering fruits by the end of the year 2024. In early 2025, middle Eastern economies such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar may invest in Afghan markets. However, that depends on the progress of peace processes in the Middle East. With Afghanistan formally a stakeholder in China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects, the trade relationship between the two countries may elevate in the first few months of 2025. That said, similar to the erstwhile Islamic Republic, the Taliban leadership appears dissatisfied with Beijing’s contribution to Afghanistan’s economy. With ribbon cut ceremonies being held almost every year, the progress at the Mes Aynak copper mine (the world’s second-largest copper deposit) appears to have stalled. The authors estimate the first extraction (upper surface/layer) to commence no later than the first half of 2025. That said, although regional economies and power nations may not have granted recognition to the Taliban government, Beijing’s engagement with the group appears to elevate by the fall of 2024.
In the context of regional response over accepting the Taliban regime as a stakeholder, none of the neighbouring economies continues to raise the issue of inclusivity in the Taliban government. Kazakhstan continues to engage with the Taliban as a neutral ally, with Uzbekistan denying access to all Uzbek warlords (including former Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum) from entering the country. To the author’s surprise, Tehran continues to enjoy greater access to the Emir Akhundzada, and according to one senior Taliban leader, it exercises some influence in the shura. However, Tehran’s influence remains untested due to the ongoing water issue with the Taliban regime, which appears to have been far from resolved. Nonetheless, the Taliban continues to build dams even under Tehran’s objections. On the note of Shiite killings in Afghanistan, the executions have largely stopped, and the land theft is primarily undertaken by the Taliban leaders themselves, leaving no choice but for the Shiite Afghans to migrate.
The exponential growth of terror factions, their networks and training camps in Afghanistan is not only a cause of great concern for regional stakeholders—but a primary concern—for New Delhi. In its three-year reign, the Taliban has:
a) Curtailed terror groups from targeting neighbouring economies (Central Asian region, to be precise)
b) Turned a blind eye to the presence of foreign fighters in Afghanistan
c) Increased recruitment of Islamist militia by financing terror camps
The authors estimate foreign fighters’ presence to have increased twice as much as the numbers in 2023, with Qatari and UAE-financed madrasas reinforcing Taliban fighter ranks with radicalized youths. According to one source, Tehran may have opened doors of recruitment, taking in radicalized Afghan youths to fill the ranks of its Axis’ in the Middle East. Since taking over political portfolios, Sirajuddin Haqqani appears to have sidelined his engagement with Al Qaeda. One source cites Al Qaeda’s apprehension over Siraj’s dual relationship with Pakistan’s ISI and Tehran. Although the Taliban appears to have increased offensives against the ISKP, no significant successes have been achieved so far. Moscow did not blame the Taliban’s inability to target the ISKP, resulting in the attack at the Crocus City Hall of March 2024, painting the operation to have been planned somewhere in Tajikistan, according to one Moscow-based security expert. Taliban leaders have handed over all Uigur militias within their ranks to Beijing, maintaining a steady relationship with Beijing’s Ministry of State Security. With that, one expert opines on the Taliban’s top intelligence agency, the General Directorate of Intelligence, to have maintained constant communications with numerous Western intelligence institutions.
But it appears to have altered its relationship with its former masters in Islamabad, particularly with Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s foreign intelligence agency, by simply refusing to direct TTP to halt any/all attacks. During the authors’ discussion, one senior Taliban leader mentioned the Emir of TTP on having familial ties with the Haqqani family, with linkages to to over three members of the clan. He further stated the presence of one leader, who was nominated by the Emir Akhundzada himself in Shura to oversee TTP’s administration. Controlling the TTP has resulted in sustained peace in the country, as compared to curbing their actions, which might trigger members of the faction to join the ISKP in vengeance.
For the FY 2024-25, the authors opine New Delhi should limit its engagement within the Taliban group to a select few leaders. The idea is to bring sustained discussion while fostering trust within the group and basing the discussion on the primary interests of promoting regional growth and prosperity and national security (such as counterterrorism, humanitarian aid and regional dialogue, preferably through the SCO). The authors recommend that New Delhi maintain steady engagement with the pragmatist group of Taliban leaders, fostering greater direct engagement within the shura with the intent to limit Islamabad’s influence (if any). Sustained engagement at the shura, with time, could assist New Delhi in understanding the Taliban as a group, fostering greater trust, even if one faction exchanges power with the other. This also means engaging actively with the Afghan diaspora in India, particularly students currently enrolled in vivid universities throughout the country. As a responsible stakeholder, New Delhi must engage with regional economies and deliberate on the issue of human rights violations and systematic segregation of women from education and public life.
No scenario can predict the collapse/capitulation of the Taliban regime or the potency of a civil war in years to come. As international support for anti-Taliban resistance groups fosters, the authors predict the Taliban regime to remain in power in the near foreseeable future. Although the presence of New Delhi in Kabul is widely appreciated by roughly all Taliban ranks, sustained engagement with the Taliban via regional dialogue could keep a check on the Taliban’s governance in the country. Anything less would deprive New Delhi of fostering trust within the group, eventually shutting doors and paving the way for Doha, Dubai, Moscow, Tehran and Beijing to establish greater engagement with the group.
About the authors:
Anant Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales.
Dr. Christian Kaunert is Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, Ireland. He is also Professor of Policing and Security, as well as Director of the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales. In addition, he is Jean Monnet Chair, Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence and Director of the Jean Monnet Network on EU Counter-Terrorism (www.eucter.net).
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.
Ljubljana/Cardiff/Dublin 7 September 2024
[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has Special Consultative status at ECOSOC/UN, New York, since 2018 and it is publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives”.
