International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses developments in the Middle East, Balkans and around the world. Anant Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales. Dr. Christian Kaunert is professor of International Security at Dublin City University. In their comprehensive analysis entitled “Beyond Doha: Why the West engages with the Taliban” they analyse the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters in Afghanistan and its influence on South Asian/East Asian economies in the context of threat posed if they decide to return to their homeland.
With Taliban completing almost three years of rule (since they first took control of Afghanistan in 2021), global economies continue to struggle on how to best deal with the group. The contention (among scholars) not only rest on nation’s employing varying diplomatic means to engage with the group, but varying mechanisms even to approach the group, one which was visible during series of engagements initiated by the United Nations in Doha, which concluded recently on June 30. The meeting witnessed participation from the official spokesperson of the Taliban, but Afghan women among other key representatives of the Afghan community, local humanitarian aid institutions and key political actors, were simply absent. Hosting a meeting with such a composition (without a legitimate entity representing local Afghans), reflects some form of compliance from the Western community to reconcile with the Taliban (on their terms), making it difficult for immediate neighbours to formulate an Afghan policy (instead forcing them to streamline their Taliban approach) without throwing regional stability into disarray.
Taking note of global economies response to the Taliban (from the authors interpretation of nations interacting with the group on the sidelines of the UN initiated Doha talks) one form of engagement has attained consensus at the global level: systematic (some scholars term it limited) polarization during short term engagement. This has initiated a trend of sustained polarization (even for short term engagement) of key legitimate representatives/political stakeholders or those opposing the Taliban during the West’s engagement with the group, at a global level. By setting up a dangerous precedent, future engagements involving private discussions with the Taliban leaders (at regional or global level) could occur without legitimate representatives or any formal representations from Afghan women leaders or Afghan led-humanitarian aid institutions/civil society associations. Thus, making it impossible for true voices of the Afghan community to reach broader, global/intellectual platforms and regional forums.
But, western political representatives appear to be simply devoid of reliable/legitimate Afghan stakeholders, offering them no choice but to simply engage with the group directly. This may be true as the few stakeholders claiming to echo the voices of local Afghans and oppose Taliban policies, are themselves in a tussle for legitimacy.
The authors categorise few remaining Afghan stakeholders opposing to the Taliban in two factions:
From a bird’s view, it appears that both stakeholders claim to represent the interests of the local Afghans. But the sheer claims of committing to the common good of Afghan lives need consensus within these stakeholders (themselves) first, then with the Afghan intellectual community (also referred as elites) and influential groups. The authors define influential groups as members of the academic community, erstwhile diplomatic corps, political leadership of the erstwhile republic, and Afghan think tank community.
Let us now evaluate individual approaches of the aforementioned stakeholders, reviewing their perspectives.
When the Taliban was fewer than weeks away from Kabul, international community held series of deliberations with local political leaders and Afghan elites on the ramifications from the group’s takeover. The discussions majorly covered behaviour of the Taliban, exploring the possibility of some ideological change, in the group. All Afghan stakeholders (influencers and interlocutors) unanimously agreed on engaging with the group, with the influencers hoping to to garner some weight over the Taliban. This resulted, international aid institutions and humanitarian aid organizations/non-governmental bodies even the United Nations, to engage with the stakeholders, justifying their engagement on the pretext of Afghanistan’s dire economic situations, emphasising assistance to marginal groups (through the influencers) raising the stakes of their engagement.
With three years almost coming to an end, international groups and western economies which had engaged with these stakeholders and held serious deliberation on various issues (from tailored requests to specific engagements) are now engaging with the Taliban directly. Many foreign institutions sought assistance from group to facilitate diplomatic dialogue, engage with the Gulf states (Saudi, Qatar and Turkey), prominent religious clerics (including dedicated discussions with influential Qari/Qazi within the Taliban ranks) host religious forums (in Kabul and Mazar) with the intent to appease the Taliban, seek negotiations with key Taliban affiliated clerics on controversial issues (Taliban’s stance on Women rights and involvement of women in the workforce). This resulted in Western institutions openly offering financial relief packages (through influencers), granting Taliban concessions, with a hope for reciprocal favours. This initiated a race to provide financial aid (among power nations) which has now escalated to relaxations on visa restrictions despite atrocities committed by Taliban against marginal groups (including rampant cases of abduction/assassination and systematic isolation of women) as evident from Siraj Haqqani’s travel to UAE, with the United Nations granting travel permits to three other top political leaders of the group.
After achieving some stability in relations with the Taliban, the influencers attained a reality; their existence was justified till the international community became accustomed to the new Taliban’s reign: establishing a line of communication at first and monitor their hold to power. By late 2023, these international aid organizations and western groups began engaging with the Taliban directly. The authors conducted series of interviews with many of such stakeholders, making detailed enquiry on the scope of their direct engagement with the Taliban, categorising their interaction to the following:
Having lost their significance, the authors argue on the intent of such influencers, since none of them mentioned on discussing/representing priorities of the local Afghans with the Taliban leadership (during the authors interview), prioritising the scope of their engagement purely to exert influence on the West.
The fundamental difference between the influencers approach with that of the interlocutor’s lies in their priorities: the former aims to exercise greater influence with the Western groups while garnering some weight over the Taliban, whereas the latter aims to demonstrate their ability to mediate with western institutions, with an intent to gain respect/legitimacy within the Taliban ranks. Although the two groups, on numerous occasions, work on thin lines (appeasing the Taliban), their priorities reflect political ambitions.
Proponents of the interlocutors approach, propagate Taliban’s regime as legitimate, seeking international support/engagement with global powers, dissipating brighter development/growth prospects to counter the argument’s on Afghanistan’s dire socio-economic crisis and aims to affiliate with one particular group (some have reflected prior affiliation with key members of the Rahbari Shura and the Haqqani family) sending positive images of law and order to counter West’s propaganda of absolute lawlessness. The proponents strongly believe in hosting Taliban on a negotiating table by advocating the group as the sole legitimate entity of the Afghans. According to one cleric, some proponents (affiliated to the Haqqani family) exercise serious control over specific geographical areas of the region (border outposts with Pakistan/Iran and Eastern/South Eastern part of Afghanistan) have dedicated logistics (trafficking routes and dedicated hawala network) private militia reinforced by some military commanders and members of the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) working off the books, with some (unofficial) support from the Rahbari Shura.
According to one scholar, proponents of both the groups justify each other positions claiming legitimacy of their group, while criticising each other and defending their arguments as logical and realistic (not only in the interest of local Afghans) but vital for the future of Afghanistan. The two major factions seems to agree on appeasing the Taliban, which appears to be the only common ground. It appears that proponents of both the groups have somewhat disassociated themselves from highlighting the true needs of the local Afghans (at regional and international forums)—focussing on establishing an indirect dialogue with the Taliban, championing as a skilful mediator—benefactor in (what appears to be) a long term political dilemma for regional and global economies.
Taking long term interests into account, western groups/international organizations may have altered their policy of limited engagement with the Taliban political class to sustained constructive dialogue, focussing on achieving long term strategic interests in their Taliban policy. This model of sustained engagement would mean establishing an absolute line of communication directly with the Taliban political leadership, even at the expense of removing Afghan stakeholders from the equation (could have potentially hindered in establishing direct relationship) practically negating the group’s existence.
This could have resulted the Western groups and international organizations on bringing transformation (which appeared to be inevitable) in their relationship with the Taliban, dropping the Afghan-inclusive approach and adapt an exclusive Taliban-policy as part of their Afghan strategy.
With Taliban controlling all pillars of governance, it eases the West to communicate directly with one single entity (members of the Rahbari Shura who then delegate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any relevant ministry to undertake their request) limiting their interaction to one political group, instead of dealing with the various factions within the Taliban directly. The Islamic Emirate is an entity devoid of functioning civil society groups, independent tribal elders/war lords, multiple political affiliations (representations), society driven social enterprises/entities, free-speech dedicated media houses, or even a dedicated cohort of Afghan academia, which could have played unique responsibilities in a civilisation elsewhere, resulting the western groups to expand multiple engagements and employ Afghan stakeholders to drive a certain agenda. Beside domestic security threats (challenges emanating from ISKP in particular), western groups face no challenge in engaging with the political class as they have in the past. Taking note of the West’s long term Taliban approach, engaging with stakeholders could have resulted in subsequent delays than engaging with the Taliban political class, directly.
With three years under its belt, it will not be incorrect to say that the Taliban leadership is beginning to achieve a grasp on governance, but remains devoid of skill oriented cohort of bureaucrats, relevant technical knowledge to deliver governance effectively/efficiently. That said, the Taliban still find themselves within sanctions list of many economies, including the UN, making it difficult to engage in financial negotiations resulting in prolong engagement and untimely delay in payment of existing (limited) projects. Taking emotional perspective, the authors opine that Taliban does not represent the people of Afghanistan, instead it represents itself as an entity.
That said, from a realistic perspective all pillars of governance is under explicit control of the Taliban, forcing the west to engage with group directly, taking long term strategic interests into account, and it appears that the relationship would rather deepen than stagnant. During an interview with one such foreign entity, the authors could identify a structure in the pattern of the entity’s engagement with the Taliban, classifying it into short-term expectations to long term goals. On enquiring the West’s inability in securing women rights or even pressuring the Taliban to adopt women-centric approaches as a social policy, members of the entity provided vague explanations, proving their inability/disinterest in securing women’s rights or even elevating economic conditions of the local Afghans.
A vague response does not necessary reflect the West’s disinterest in raising the issues of Women seclusion in Taliban’s socioeconomic approach or an absolute disinterest of any entity from supporting Women-led socio-economic policy, but the cards say for itself. As Taliban complete three years of rule, the West have altered its policy towards Afghanistan, disassociating from Afghan stakeholders while establishing a direct line of communication with Taliban political leadership (not because of sheer concern for socio-economic elevation of local Afghans or elevate the dire humanitarian situation in the country) basing it purely on regional/foreign policy calculus.
That said, with no entity raising the voices of local Afghans in international/regional forums the impact of the West’s sustained engagement with the Taliban in the long term, will prove catastrophic. This appears to be true since nations seems to already adapt the Taliban-centric approach with some aiming to expand this engagement, silencing those still advocating for an Afghan-inclusive approach. The West’s approach may appear logical (at best), it could potentially destroy the sheer fabric of Afghan unity plunging the nation into civil war (not today or tomorrow) but in the near forcible future.
About the authors:
Anant Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales.
Dr. Christian Kaunert is Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, Ireland. He is also Professor of Policing and Security, as well as Director of the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales. In addition, he is Jean Monnet Chair, Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence and Director of the Jean Monnet Network on EU Counter-Terrorism (www.eucter.net).
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.
Ljubljana/Cardiff/Dublin 23 July 2024
[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has Special Consultative status at ECOSOC/UN, New York, since 2018 and it is publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives”.
