International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses developments in the Middle East, Balkans and around the world. Anant Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales. Dr. Christian Kaunert is professor of International Security at Dublin City University. In their comprehensive analysis entitled “A Mujahid’s dilemma: Tracing foreign terrorist fighters’ influx post-the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan” they analyse the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters in Afghanistan and its influence on South Asian/East Asian economies in the context of threat posed if they decide to return to their homeland.
In August 2021, after US forces withdrew from Afghanistan, the Taliban took over Kabul with little to no resistance (besides serious firefight in Panjshir between Talibs & members of the National Resistance Front), forming an interim government and completing two years of governance in 2023. As the world transits to 2024, the Taliban proved numerous predictions untrue, gripping hold to power in the region and slowly transiting from an Islamist insurgent group to a net-security provider of the local Afghans. Since taking over Kabul, one would argue, insurgent driven violence has largely decreased, but the state continues to experience one of the worst economic and humanitarian crises, with an upward trajectory of violence induced by different sects, against each other.[2]
As the Taliban continues to strengthen its position, it’s relationship with other Islamist factions (which may have once supported the group during insurgency) deteriorates, as reflected from the surge of attacks (against key Taliban leaders) carried by Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) since August 2021. To the context of the Taliban’s working relationship with al-Qaeda (exercised primarily through Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban Minister of Interior), experts remain skeptical on the Taliban granting some leverage to Al Qaeda-linked networks to flourish or even recruit fighters within Afghanistan. Some experts believe Al Qaeda is taking a meagre supervisory role, focusing on Islamist propaganda at the behest of Siraj Haqqani.[3] Whereas some find this point contradictory, arguing Al Qaeda being focused on recruitment from Central Asian nations, filling the Taliban ranks.
That said, if the aforementioned argument holds true for the global community (particularly for South Asian economies), is Afghanistan heading to, or, has already become a hub for foreign terrorist fighters under the Taliban regime? If not, is there an influx of foreign fighters entering Afghanistan and will it increase in 2024?[4]
Taking the aforementioned questions into account, the authors have based this analysis on two key questions: did the Taliban, after coming to power, impact recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters entering in the region? And what does this mean for South Asian/East Asian economies to the context of threat posed by these fighters, if they decide to return to their homeland?
With the Taliban completing two years in power, the presence of foreign terror fighters in the region does not surprise the authors. Even before the Taliban formally took over Kabul, A UN Security Council report published in June 2021, estimated foreign terrorist fighters between 8,000 and 10,000 in the country then, with nationalities from Central Asian economies, the Caucasian region of the Russian Federation, northern provinces of Pakistan and some from Xinjiang, Uighur Autonomous Region of China.[5] By one estimate, June 2022, witnessed a dip in the presence of foreign terrorist fighters in the region, between 3,000 and 4,000 – primarily affiliated to the Taliban, deputed to fill the ranks of Tehrik-e-the Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a the Taliban affiliate group.[6] By another estimate, June 2023 witnessed a tide of recruits volunteering from terror factions in Central Asian economies to join the Taliban ranks. More than 7000 fighters may have joined the Taliban ranks alone between June and August 2023, presenting itself as a model entity ‘more structured, hierarchical and truly Islamist’, than others South/Central Asia.[7]
That said, foreign terrorist fighters have also joined the ranks of Islamic State (Daesh) in Afghanistan, in significant numbers. According to the UN Secretary General, in June 2022, he had reported ISKP ranks to have been doubled than their initial estimated size from 2020-21, growing from an estimate of 2,500 fighters to almost 4,000 fighters with half recruits volunteering from regional terror factions.[8] ISKP membership have garnered greater recruitment because of internal tussle within the Taliban factions – Akhundzada’s preferential treatment in appointments at Rahbari Shura or provincial commanders, religious clerics, governors and special emphasis to sect based propagandists, alienating ambitious foreign fighters, certain ethnicities even loyalist Talibs (hoping for recognition and key appointments) – unifying their hatred under one flag.[9] Since July 2022, ISKP has been focusing on recruiting foreign terror factions, picking up certain ethnicities that are at swords against the Taliban. This has resulted in increased recruitment of Tajik fighters, taking the benefit of their grievances against the larger Pashtuns, channeling it against the Taliban leadership and hailing Tajik led attacks against them.[10] ISKP can also be perceived as more lucrative due to its ability to pay higher monthly wages than the Taliban. According to one estimate, a Taliban fighter makes 75$ to 100$ a day, whereas an ISKP fighter makes anywhere between 200$ to 250$ a day. That said, ISKP’s ability to pay has resulted in severe desertion in regional Islamist factions, including 50 Uighurs and almost 75 to 90 Tajiks from the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), 65 Uzbeks from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) to ISKP, according to one expert.[11]
In the context of fighters within the Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) – officially reported in May 2022, stood anywhere between 200 to 400 then, according to one estimate, stands anywhere between 800 to 1200 in August 2023 – mostly originating from Pakistan & Afghanistan with some nationalities from Bangladesh and Myanmar.[12] Other Islamist groups such as the ETIM, IMU including Pakistan sponsored Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), comprise a total of 2000 to 4000 fighters.[13] According to one scholar, even after completion two years of reign, in August 2023, there were no visible actions undertaken by the Rahbari Shura or any decree issued by the Emir to provincial leaders in the context of foreign fighters within their ranks. To that, one may conclude, terror factions (Islamist groups) enjoy greater freedom of movement under the IEA than, in the erstwhile republic.[14]
How can one travel to Afghanistan? Taking that question to a senior counter terrorism expert based in London, he cited numerous conversations intercepted from individuals looking to travel from South East Asian economies to join the new IEA, mainly enquiring on existing Islamist networks for potential allegiance or for assistance in prospective travel.[15] That said, security agencies and independent experts alike argue on Afghanistan transitioning from a perspective safe haven to a potential safe ground for foreign terrorist fighters, opening recruitment opportunities to regional Islamist groups such as IMU or ETIM to ISKP and reinforce ranks, raise finances even execute operations (in case of ISKP against the Taliban).[16] Months before the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, experts argued on a potential increase in travel patterns (altering course from Middle East to Afghanistan) regional Islamist factions from South East Asia entering into Afghanistan through illegal routes from Pakistan, with Central Asian and South East Asian based groups entering Badakhshan via Tajikistan.[17]
With 2024 in hindsight, the authors identify numerous factors that could result in a potential increase in foreign fighters entering into Afghanistan:
That may be true, geographically, Afghanistan shares more than boundaries but greater cultural and ethnic ties with Central Asia rather than Syria, Iraq or Yemen. It shares linguistic and social fabric across the borders with Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmen sharing not just familial ties but international borders. An influx of ethnic based foreign terrorists within Afghanistan will have ripple effect in Central Asian economies.”[24] This is all the more true for Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), which continues to expand recruiting drives in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, using its media wing Al Azaim, to public propaganda materials in Tajik, Uzbek, and other regional languages with an intent to exploit vulnerable masses to join their ranks.[25] That said, according to one security expert, fighters with nationalities from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan currently fighting in Syria, Yemen and Iraq are making a move to return to their homeland via Afghanistan without worrying for an arrest warrant or prosecution.”[26]
Despite taking the aforementioned factors into account, the authors did not find sizeable movements of foreign terrorists (between 2021, 2022 & November 2023) but predicts a change in this trend for 2024.[27] According to one expert, central Asian states witnessed fewer numbers in transition, with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan witnessing more of its citizens making a move across Amu Dariya.”[28] That said, with Gaza still under siege, Afghanistan may witness a thrust in foreign fighters, making it a transit hub for a perspective jihad in the Middle East.
Even with two years in power, mass mobilization of foreign terrorists in Afghanistan have not fructified as expected by many scholars. That said, the on-going war in Gaza and the Taliban’s stability in the region may alter the outcome for 2024. While identifying reasons of less mobilization in the last two years, the authors highlight two (potential) factors that could alter the outcome for 2024.
To that end, if the aforementioned arguments hold true, foreign terrorist/Islamists factions in South & Central Asia, are likely to move to Afghanistan with intent to expand their professional experience/battle training before making a move elsewhere.
This further means that, for certain Islamist factions (anti-Taliban) there could be a significant increase in recruitment within the ISKP ranks, moving from relatively less violent regions to Afghanistan, marking a trajectory for sympathetic groups/individuals to follow the trail.”[31] As assessed by one counter-terrorism expert in Lebanon, potential travellers may now leave comfortable lives behind (for a cause) and travel to Afghanistan in an intend to gather significant experience, enough to withstand combat in Syria before relocating to Turkey for possible recuperation.[32]
Logistically, such foreign fighters may enter Afghanistan through facilitation from sympathetic Wahhabi non-government organizations and humanitarian centers well networked through madrassas, at the behest of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Pakistan.[33] Travelling to Syria may be facilitated by Haqqani’s or partnered factions supported by Saudi or Qataris, transiting from Iran. This could force Ankara to propose greater relaxations on entry of such fighters in the region, perhaps even proposing to facilitate entry into Europe (highly likely) elevating Turkey at the high table in the Middle East, with a possible ear to EU. An entry into turkey would relieve stress on such clandestine travellers since:
That said, it is highly likely for foreign fighters entering into Afghanistan to increase in 2024. To that end, the authors have classified them on the basis of their willingness to travel to (and from) Afghanistan:
The Motivated
Security establishments hoping to monitor/track foreign terrorist fighters travelling to Afghanistan must identify certain (potential) individuals, who are highly motivated to take this journey. To that end, by 2024, the authors predict a trend of foreign fighters entering into Afghanistan:
In the light of on-going Israel-Hamas war, Islamist fighters from South East/South Asia may actively look for battlefield for quick experience before making a move into Egypt, Syria, Yemen, via Afghanistan.[35] Those fighters willing to return to their homeland in South East Asia/South Asia, could potentially use Turkey, as a transit hub using Islamist humanitarian networks to access the land routes via Iran entering Afghanistan with the assistance from the Taliban’s border police. In 2023, travel routes altered frequently due to the Russia-Ukraine war, but according to one scholar, Islamist fighters made numerous crossings via Waziristan with support from Pakistani intelligence, possibly recruited to reinforce ISI sponsored Islamist terror groups. That said, the land route in particular, is of several thousand kilometers, which can take months if not weeks of travel. Reaching Afghanistan from Central Asian economies may not attract significant support, but a transit from Syria/Iraq to Afghanistan relies principally on motivated recruitment networks with similar ideology and objectives. Potential motivated individuals from central Asian economies (also applicable for South East/Asian nations) could use potentially small-scale smuggling networks, entering Afghanistan via ethnic based warlords/militia-controlled territories sympathetic to their cause.
The Experienced
Security establishments must retain their focus on active recruitment and potential travel of motivated individuals/fighters, those already battle-hardened pose a greater risk for Central and South Asian economies, particularly due to its proximity in the neighborhood. In the light of fewer data available on active foreign terrorist fighters currently within the Taliban or other Islamist ranks, the authors argue of a possibility for such battle-hardened militants to make frequent visits to their homeland.[36] This is possible from the Taliban issuing national identification cards and erstwhile republic passports identifying them as Afghan nationals.[37]
The Freelancers
Before the Israel-Hamas war, Islamist factions and militant groups were developing more lethal and cost-effective attack modules devoid of specialized training or relevant tools to carry out attacks. After October 7, the authors witnessed a sudden surge in Islamist factions/motivated lone wolves seeking quicker ways to enter conflict zones, some potentials reaching out to active terrorist sympathizers directly for transit, either alone or in groups seeking an affiliation. This resulted in a surge within AQ factions to restart training modules, partnering with organized networks for greater access to smuggling routes, with intent to train even the most amateur fighters, forfeiting the term freelancers.[38]
It will not be incorrect to state that, the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021 and subsequent stability in power (in 2023) has motivated Islamists factions (Hamas to name a few) all across the world, remerging Afghanistan as the most attractive destination for potential fighters, young recruits, motivated individuals, and Islamist factions alike. Potential recruits are already being identified/approached by ISKP recruitment cells, exploiting their grievances against their homeland, motivating them to join the fight in eastern Afghanistan, with intent to expand influence in their homeland, in the years to come.
That said, with non-governmental organizations and certain government watch dogs still active in Afghanistan, the term safe-haven may become interchangeable in 2024 and beyond, if the situation continues to persist. The Israel-Hamas war has potentially impacted leadership and modus operandi of many Islamists factions, forfeiting small scall attacks, reorienting tactical skills by thriving to participate/engage in conflict zones for greater experiences.
As discussed above, the authors have designated three key groups for security establishments to track movements to (and from) Afghanistan:
It is without a doubt impossible for the authors to simply state/brand Afghanistan as a hub of terrorism (in the light of limited available data), but in 2024 the trends do point towards an increased transit to (and from) Afghanistan pointing towards its possibility. With limited information available on open source, devoid of active intelligence institutions focused on the reason, the authors argue on the need for greater/detailed assessment to acknowledge this possibility.
That said, terror threats emanating from Afghanistan may potentially increase in 2024 as foreign terrorists’ transit into Afghanistan after being inspired not just by the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul but the on-going Israel-Hamas war, instilling refueling their objectives, which were largely forgotten after Islamic State demise in Syria & Iraq. For 2024, Afghanistan may certainly become a theatre delivering much surprise.
About the authors:
Anant Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales.
Dr. Christian Kaunert is Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, Ireland. He is also Professor of Policing and Security, as well as Director of the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales. In addition, he is Jean Monnet Chair, Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence and Director of the Jean Monnet Network on EU Counter-Terrorism (www.eucter.net).
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.
Ljubljana/Cardiff/Dublin 28 May 2024
[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has Special Consultative status at ECOSOC/UN, New York, since 2018 and it is publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives”.
[2] Bizhan, Nematullah. 2022. “State Fragility.” State Fragility.
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[3] Hassan, Yaqoob-Ul-. 2022. “Taliban and Al-Qaeda: The Unbreakable Relationship.” Strategic Analysis 46 (2): 211–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2022.2076305.
[4] Farhadi, Adib. 2023. “Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: The Heavy Price of Treating Long-Term Strategic Issues with Short-Term Tactical Approaches BT - The Great Power Competition Volume 4: Lessons Learned in Afghanistan: America’s Longest War.” In , edited by Adib Farhadi and Anthony Masys, 1–13. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22934-3_1.
[5] United Nations Security Council. 2021. “Twenty-Eighth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2368 (2017) Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities.” https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2021_655_E.pdf.
[6] Akhtar, Shahzad, and Zahid Shahab Ahmed. n.d. “Understanding the Resurgence of the Tehrik-e-The Taliban Pakistan.” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2023.2280924.
[7] In discussion with a State Department official on the promise of anonymity
[8] Rehman, Zia ur. 2022. “How ISKP Has Affected Afghanistan, Regional Security in The Taliban-Ruled Country.” Voice of America, August 14, 2022. https://www.voanews.com/a/how-iskp-has-affected-afghanistan-regional-security-in-the Taliban-ruled-country/6701180.html.
[9] In discussion with a former Afghan NDS official on the promise of anonymity
[10] Webber, Lucas. 2022. “The Taliban Target Tajik Islamic State Fighters.” Eurasia Net, July 29, 2022. https://eurasianet.org/the Taliban-target-tajik-islamic-state-fighters.
[11] In discussion with a State Department official on the promise of anonymity
[12] Sayed, Abdul, and Tore Refslund Hamming. 2023. “The Growing Threat of the Islamic State in Afghanistan and South Asia.”
[13] In discussion with a former Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) official on the promise of anonymity
[14] Mehran, Weeda, Dominika Imiolek, Lucy Smeddle, and Jack Springett-Gilling. 2022. “The Depiction of Women in Jihadi Magazines: A Comparative Analysis of Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistan.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 33 (3): 382–408.
[15] In conversation with a senior counterterrorism official with State Department.
[16] Blair, Christopher W, and Philip B K Potter. 2023. “The Strategic Logic of Large Militant Alliance Networks.” Journal of Global Security Studies 8 (1): ogac035.
[17] Parveen, Tahira, Zainab Siddiqui, Nazir Hussain Shah, and Muhammad Akram Soomro. 2023. “Security and Economic Prospects of Fencing Along Pak-Afghan Border.” Journal of Politics and International Studies 6 (2).
[18] Cook, Joana, and Shiraz Maher. 2023. The Rule Is for None But Allah: Islamist Approaches to Governance. Oxford University Press.
[19] Ibrahimi, Salem, and Sam Vincent. n.d. “The Evolving Information Environment in Afghanistan.”
[20] Basit, Abdul. 2023. “Afghanistan-Pakistan’s Radical Social Media Ecosystem: Actors, Propaganda Comparison and Implications.” Counter Terrorist Trends & Analysis 15 (4).
[21] Hadzhiev, Boyan. n.d. “Adaptation of Propaganda and Communication: The Online Magazines of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State Compared.” In How Terrorists Learn, 103–22. Routledge.
[22] Fisher, Ali, and Nico Prucha. 2023. “The Taliban-Al-Qaeda Nexus: Brothers in Arms.” In Routledge Handbook of Transnational Terrorism, 528–44. Routledge.
[23] Prezelj, Iztok, and Luka Zalokar. 2024. “Recruitment Models and Approaches of Islamist Terrorist Groups: The Cases of Al Qaeda and ISIS.” Cogent Social Sciences 10 (1): 2289873.
[24] Jeganaathan, J. 2023. “Dealing with the New Taliban Regime in Afghanistan.” National Security 6 (1): 46–68.
[25] Verma, Raj, and Shahid Ali. 2023. “How the Islamic State Rivalry Pushes the Taliban to Extremes.” Middle East Policy.
[26] The authors used predictive analytical method, collating data points since Taliban rule in August 2021 till November 2023. The data sets were put in Time Series model with recruitment parameters to predict trends for 2024
[27] In conversation with a State Department official
[28] Collins, Kathleen. 2023. Politicizing Islam in Central Asia: From the Russian Revolution to the Afghan and Syrian Jihads. Oxford University Press.
[29] Prezelj, Iztok, and Luka Zalokar. 2024. “Recruitment Models and Approaches of Islamist Terrorist Groups: The Cases of Al Qaeda and ISIS.” Cogent Social Sciences 10 (1): 2289873.
[30] Jules, Tavis D. 2023. “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).” The Handbook of Homeland Security, 317–24.
[31] Verma, Raj, and Shahid Ali. 2023. “How the Islamic State Rivalry Pushes the Taliban to Extremes.” Middle East Policy.
[32] Szekely, Ora. 2023. Syria Divided: Patterns of Violence in a Complex Civil War. Columbia University Press.
[33] Morisco, Vito. 2023. “From Rebel Governance to Institutionalization? Prospects for the Taliban and Afghanistan.”
[34] Vrânceanu, Alina, Elias Dinas, Tobias Heidland, and Martin Ruhs. 2023. “The European Refugee Crisis and Public Support for the Externalisation of Migration Management.” European Journal of Political Research 62 (4): 1146–67.
[35] Vincent, Elemanya A. 2023. “Terrorism and Global Security: A Comparative Analysis of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS).” Saudi J. Humanities Soc Sci 8 (10): 318–28.
[36] Olsson, Peter A. 2023. “Zawahiri and Bin Laden’s Evangelistic Legacy: ISIS and Al Qaeda’s Magnetism for Arab and Muslim Youths.” The Journal of Psychohistory 50 (4): 261–73.
[37] In conversation with a former Afghan NDS official
[38] Habeeb, Angham Adil, and Ali Hussien Hamad. 2023. “The Manifestations of The Contemporary Combat Tactics of Terrorism (Lone Wolves as A Model).” Resmilitaris 13 (2): 2699–2710.
